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Cover and above: Weaving and sculpture are 
among the various art forms which the residents of 
Bethel, Bielefeld, West Germany, use as essential 
elements of therapy to help themselves become 
aware of their abilities to do useful and creative 
work with their hands. 
Over 7000 people live and work together at Bethel. 
About 2500 of the residents are sick, disabled, or 
socially unaccepted. The remaining population con-
sists of doctors, psychologists, pastors, teachers, 
deacons, deaconesses, as well as many other Bethel 
workers and their families. 
The exhibit from Bethel entitled "Creating-Work-
ing-Helping" was displayed on VU campus at 
Deaconess Hall last spring and is touring in the US 
through 1987. 
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IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor 
Christians and Political Debate 
Few aspects of religious life in America are less 
edifying than the mutual bashing that regularly takes 
place between Christians on the political Right and the 
political Left. Politics is serious and often nasty busi-
ness, and it becomes notably the more so when 
ideological differences get compounded by doctrinal 
intensities. 
The political confusion that results from this matters 
less than does the damage it inflicts on the general 
Christian witness. We should not be surprised when 
Christians disagree with each other about the political 
implications of their faith . They have done so 
throughout history and there is no plausible reason to 
expect that situation to change. There is cause for dis-
may, however, when Christians turn their disagree-
ments with each other about politics into charges of 
bad faith and moral inadequacy. 
Much of the time political differences between 
Christians follow theological lines. Liberal Christians 
are often liberal in general, and conservative Chris-
tians more often than not take a consistently conserva-
tive approach to the whole of life. Ideas cluster, and 
so do people. 
But not always: consider the Evangelicals. Evangeli-
cal Christians share a commitment to historic Chris-
tianity as commonly understood among orthodox be-
lievers (at least those in the Calvinist tradition) and 
they are all dedicated to an intensive and complete 
grounding of faith and life in the biblical witness. 
Evangelicals lead integrated lives: all thought and ac-
tion is submitted unconditionally to the lordship of 
Christ and the test of scripture. 
Yet in recent years, deep political divisions have aris-
en within the Evangelical community. Surveys indicate 
that most Evangelicals tend to conservatism in their 
political views (though many display a populist streak 
on economic issues); Jerry Falwell cannot be said to 
speak politically for the entire Evangelical community, 
but he does represent the dominant trend within it. 
Yet Falwell hardly goes unopposed. Evangelicals of a 
liberal or radical political persuasion may still be a 
minority, but they are increasingly visible and vocal. 
Through groups such as Evangelicals for Social Action 
and journals such as Sojourners the Evangelical Left has 
made itself a significant force . 
All this represents a marked break from the Amer-
ican Evangelical past, which has, in this century at 
least, had a distinctively apolitical, or even anti-politi-
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cal, tinge. Most Evangelicals have apparently now 
changed their minds and decided that faith does, in 
fact, have political implications, but they have not 
found it possible to agree as to the specifics of those 
implications. This has led to increasingly heated ex-
changes between Evangelicals of differing political 
views. 
The situation has grown serious enough that Ronald 
Sider, a professor of theology at Eastern Baptist 
Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, has publicly 
proposed that something be done about it ("A Plea for 
Conservative Radicals and Radical Conservatives," The 
Christian Century, October 1, 1986). Profesor Sider 
himself is on the political Left-he is chairman of 
Evangelicals for Social Action and a contributing edi-
tor of Sojourners-but he is attempting to appeal to his 
fellow Evangelicals above their partisan or ideological 
loyalties. He deplores the attacks and name-calling on 
all sides and urges the contending parties to listen 
more openly and sympathetically to each other, to lo-
cate their points of disagreement more precisely, and 
to covenant together to conduct their political debates 
"civilly, honestly, fairly, and biblically." 
Professor Sider's is an admirable and positive enter-
prise. He is surely right in urging Christians to con-
duct their political debates with each other in ways 
that reflect and honor their common calling. The 
church should be a zone of decency and integrity in 
debate about public affairs, a place where political op-
ponents transcend distortions, stereotypes, and ex-
changes of insults and instead attempt honestly to en-
gage the issues in discussions that, in Professor Sider's 
words, are "vigorous but not vicious." 
Professor Sider is also right to suggest that the 
Christion Right and Left have much to learn from 
each other: radicals can teach conservatives that the 
need for social justice is urgent and that pleas for 
greater economic equality are not necessarily expres-
sions of crypto-Marxism; and conservatives, for their 
part, can usefully remind radicals that religious and 
political liberty are essential to any decent politics and 
that Leftist governments generally have wretched rec-
ords in these areas. 
Yet while applauding Professor Sider's initiative, we 
also have to recognize its limits. Professor Sider is not 
so naive as to believe that integrity and openness 
among Christians in debate will eliminate deep disa-
greements and he is not suggesting some sentimen-
talized version of Christian fellowship whereby we re-
frain from plain speaking with each other, but he does 
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appear rather more hopeful than is warranted about 
the degree of common ground that is likely to be 
staked out. 
His problem stems precisely from his Evangelical 
perspective. Throughout his essay, Sider returns regu-
larly to the point that Evangelicals contending about 
their politics must submit their differing views to the 
test of scripture. He considers it "a farce" that both he 
and Jerry Falwell "continue forever telling the Ameri-
can public that our contradictory public policy stands 
are thoroughly biblical." The way out of this scandal 
is for Evangelicals of all political persectives to sit 
down together and "test the biblical validity" of their 
conflicting views. That advice follows from Sider's view 
that Christians must strive "to submit their total lives 
to biblical revelation," but it unfortunately expects of 
scripture other than what it can reasonably be ex-
pected to provide. 
Most Christians have long since learned not to re-
gard the Bible as a textbook on science; one wonders 
why so many continue to look upon it as a primer on 
politics. The Bible tells us what is necessary to make 
us wise unto ·salvation, but it ought not be read as a 
prime source on economics, sociology, or political 
philosophy. The Old Testament contains many 
eloquent passages on justice and equity, but general 
moral exhortations addressed to a tribal theocracy can 
hardly be expected to provide any sort of blueprint 
for political behavior in the modern world. And the 
New Testament simply does not address itself in any 
concentrated way to the manner in which we ought to 
make our political arrangements. Sider deplores the 
habit of Christians bombarding each other with selec-
tive proof-texts, but for those determined to base their 
politics in scripture, there is no alternative. Random 
proof-texts are all they have. 
The awkward reality is that there is no simple way 
to translate general moral imperatives into public pol-
icy. We are enjoined by scripture to peace and justice, 
but the precise definition of those terms and the 
means by which they might best be achieved remains 
entirely problematic. Search the scriptures as we 
might, we are unlikely thereby to be able to sort out 
our political differences. The general rules of Chris-
tian morality do place certain political options off lim-
its-we cannot be racists or fascists-but within the 
broad limits of the morally permissible there are end-
less possibilities for valid choice and perpetual debate. 
Christians face the dilemma of having to apply 
theological and moral principles to their political lives 
but of disciplining themselves at the same time not to 
pretend to know more than has been authoritatively 
revealed to them. They know that they must behave 
decently and charitably in politics and that they must 
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not succumb to dishonesty, self-deception, or selective 
moral indignation in analysis of public policy. But 
beyond that they have only prudence, fallible reason-
and, one hopes, large doses of humility-to guide 
them. 
All of which is to say that if Christians hope to reach 
common ground in political debate, they will find it 
not through scouring the Bible for a proper political 
program but through exercising the mutual love, for-
giveness, and forebearance that the biblical gospel 
urges on them and that embodies the unity they enjoy 
which transcends politics. Beyond that, they are free to 
fight like the devil. C: 
Day's End 
The river makes its presence known 
Lying back of town like a lead pipe. 
Altering its face like time, 
It sometimes flows backwards, 
Windruffled like a bulldog's 
Hair rubbed the wrong way. 
But mostly it flows forward, 
Still, reflecting naked 
Bones of trees. 
Having carried away the apple 
Cores of a thousand lunches, 
It circulates through 
Sclerotic afternoons, 
Meandering across my video screen, 
Gently tugging my fingers 
From their keys. 
Then a whistle blows and 
The wind rakes 
Leaves across the asphalt. 
The geese flying south 
Honk overhead and 
Beat back the light with 
Powerful wings. 
A shaft of sunlight 
Stabs through the clouds. 








MUTUAL LOVE AND CHRISTIAN LOVE 
Unresolved Tens ions in Christian Ethics 
In a justly famous paragraph from his Interpretation 
of Christian Ethics, Reinhold Niebuhr writes: 
The ethical fruitfulness of various types of religion is 
determined by the quality of their tension between the 
historical and the transcendent. This quality is meas-
ured by two considerations: The degree to which the 
transcendent truly transcends every value and achieve-
ment of history, so that no relative value of historical 
achievement may become the basis of moral compla-
cency; and the degree to which the transcendent re-
mains in organic contact with the historical, so that no 
degree of tension may rob the historical of its signifi-
cance.1 
In a yet relevant critique of various religious tradi-
tions of the time of his writing-the 1930s-Niebuhr 
showed how such creative tension might be prema-
turely resolved, to the detriment of that tradition's 
"ethical fruitfulness ." In the following, I do not wish 
to criticize particular religious trends and groups-
though it would be fun to do so. Rather, I wish to 
propose a more theoretical consideration of the rela-
tion between the historical (mutual love) and the tran-
scendent (agape love}, arguing for a particular kind of 
relation that does in fact enhance the fruitfulnesss of 
Christian morality. 
In pursuing this skeletal argument, I will move 
through three steps: first, I will attempt descriptions 
of what I mean by mutual and agape love; second, I 
will analyze two common ways of prematurely resolv-
Robert Benne has recently returned to Roanoke College in 
Salem, Virginia from a sabbatical leave in England. At 
Roanoke he is the Jordan-Trexler Professor of Religion, the 
Chairman of the Department of Religion and Philosophy, 
and the Director of the Center for Church and Society. He 
is author of The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: A 
Moral Reassessment (1981) . His most recent contribution 
to The Cresset, "Neoconservatism and Neoliberalism: Is 
There a Real Difference?" appeared in October, 1984. 
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ing the "quality of tension" between mutual and agape 
love; third, I will illustrate a proper relation, i.e., one 
that does not erode the quality of the tension, by con-
sidering the relation of the notion of friendship to the 
ideal of Christian love. I do not claim much originality 
in my analysis. It involves a blending of the insights of 
Reinhold Niebuhr (An Interpretation of Christian Ethics), 
Richard Niebuhr ("The Center of Value"), and Gilbert 
Meilaender (Friendship). 
I 
The Christian ethical norm of agape arises from the 
central religious proclamation of the Christian Gospel. 
God demonstrates an incredible, discontinuous, and 
surprising kind of love toward humankind in the 
teaching, ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus the 
Christ. That kind of love-saving, forgiving, justify-
ing-provides the "transcendent" pole in our discus-
sion; it is the grace of God. As such it has certain dis-
cernible qualities that put it into bold relief. 
It is universal-directed at all humans. It aims at the 
full redemption of the whole universe of being. God's 
grace is offered to the just and unjust alike. While it 
may give special consideration to the vulnerable, much 
like a parent gives special attention to a child who has 
special need, it nevertheless embraces all equally. 
Second, God's agape love is disinterested; it does not 
love because of the "worth" of its object nor is it con-
ditioned by a guarantee of reciprocal response. This 
gives it an initiating quality as well as a certain kind of 
heedlessness; it does not calculate a return, though it 
may wish one. This disinterestedness is also bound up 
with forgiveness, the capacity to heal the ruptures in 
relationships and start anew. 
Third, God's agape love is steadfastly faithful; al-
though all else changes, transcendent love is everlast-
ingly trustworthy. Finally, though it may not be intrin-
1Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New 
York: Meridian Books, 1958}, p. 5. 
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sically a part of agape love, sacrifice is often involved 
in the exercise of agape in a fallen world. Love that 
is universal, disinterested, and steadfast will take into 
itself the wrath involved in alienated existence. The 
cross is a powerful symbol of the cost of expressing 
agape love. 
So the event of Christ is the revelation and expres-
sion of the character and will of God from the Chris-
tian religious viewpoint. The difficulty for Christian 
ethics comes when it is supposed to make this religious 
norm ethically relevant. And without doubt, that task 
has stimulated a perennial debate within Christian his-
tory. How is God's love in Christ-agape-to be re-
flected in the lives of Christians enmeshed in history? 
How is Christ related to culture in the Christian life? 
In contrast to agape love, mutual 
love is preferential. Persons choose 
those others who fit them as friends 
and spouses. Such "fits" are limited. 
Being enmeshed in history, persons are involved in 
many relations characterized by mutual love-
friendship and marriage are prime examples. Many 
other relations are characterized by mutual respect, 
enrichment, and usefulness that are not yet mutual 
love but would be open to it should circumstances and 
choice permit. Mutual love, to paraphrase Richard 
Niebuhr, arises when one being with capacities and 
potentialities completes, complements, and limits 
another being.2 There is a symmetry involved in 
mutual love-a fittingness of being to being. Persons 
reciprocally meet the needs, fit the capacities, and cor-
respond to the potentialities of each other. Figuratively 
put, we fill each other's cups. Such relations are gener-
ally sealed and shored by promises-either implicit or 
explicit. 
In contrast to agape love, mutual love is preferen-
tial.3 Persons choose those others who fit them as 
friends and spouses. These "fits" among persons are 
very limited in number. They require propitious cir-
cumstances, time for cultivation, and discriminate 
choice. The deepest friendships of one's life are few in 
number; the best marital bond only one. Without de-
2H. Richard. Niebuhr, "The Center of Value," in Radical 
Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1960), p. 103. 
3The characteristics of friendships are explicated in fine 
fashion in Gilbert Meilaender, Friendshi~A Study in 
Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981). My conclusions about the relation of 
mutual and agape love are very similar to Meilaender's. 
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nying the noble hyperbole suggested in the quote, one 
cannot be "a friend to the world." Further in contrast 
to agape's disinterestedness, mutual love is very in-
terested in reciprocal response. It recognizes that we 
are incomplete beings who need the delight, fascina-
tion, shared interests, struggles and values, intimacy 
and affection, that arise in mutual relations. 
Mutual love, unlike agape, is subject to change, as 
the fittingness of being to being may change. Who has 
not looked back with some melancholy at friendships 
that are no more because capacities, experiences, and 
value choices have changed each party enough to 
erode the complementarity that once was present? 
Finally, mutual love involves one in concrete respon-
sibilities that lend a hard edge of particularism-
perhaps even a tendency to closure-that contrasts 
with the open-endedness of agape. The human institu-
tions and communities based on mutuality entail spe-
cific, responsible interests that often rest uneasily with 
broader responsibilities. My responsibilities to my fam-
ily, for example, lead me to actions that can only be 
characterized as "defensive," sometimes necessarily so. 
II 
How then are mutual love and Christian love re-
lated? One possible response to that challenge might 
be to deny the relation. Except for certain perversions 
of the Lutheran two-kingdoms doctrine, and those ap-
plying mainly to social ethics, there is little danger of 
such a denial in the theory of Christian ethics. But in 
the practice of our lives such a danger is exceedingly 
real. 
Jeremy Taylor once wrote that "when friendship 
was the noblest thing in the world, charity was little."4 
He was of course referring to historical epochs that 
were dominated by classical notions of friendship; but 
the truth of his remark cuts deeply to those of us who 
can be comfortable with the rich mutualities of exis-
tence and therefore adopt what Richard Niebuhr 
called the ethics of defense-narrowing one's circle of 
care and concern only to those in our bonds of mutu-
ality.5 Such narrowness is notoriously evident in the 
way many Christians separate their "Sunday" lives 
from their "Monday"; business is business, politics is 
politics, and, not least, academics is academics. 
If such an approach resolves the tension by separat-
ing the historical from the transcendent, another peril 
is to make the transcendent (agape love) a simple pos-
sibility. Agape is prematurely claimed to be the direct 
4Quoted by Meilaender, p. l. 
5H. R. Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1963), p. 140. 
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norm for historical existence. The radical ethic of 
Jesus is commended as direct guidance for the Chris-
tian life. Historically this has meant at times the dis-
paragement of mutual love (there is very little in 
Christian ethics on friendship) or the disparagement 
of ordinary earthly vocations. Samuel Johnson com-
plained that Charles Wesley, though capable of con-
versation befitting friendship, never satisfactorily en-
gaged in it because he always had to be off to do the 
Lord's work.6 
Just as God's action in Christ is in 
a paradoxical and dialectical 
relationship to the fallen creation, 
so Christian ethics should not try to 
dissolve the tension between mutual 
and Christian love, but rather to 
ensure that the tension is creative. 
A more likely outcome of such a premature claim is 
hypocrisy. One simply doesn't recognize the pressure 
of mutuality and particular responsibility-let alone 
self-interest-in one's own life. When I taught business 
ethics in a seminary, I often noticed the withering 
criticism made of the business person's quest for 
profit-a necessity of that earthly vocation-even while 
the seminarians were negotiating the right salary, pen-
sion plan, location, and parsonage for their first pas-
toral call. Yet they thought their lives fully expressed 
agape love. 
Another, but more admirable, effect of taking agape 
as a direct norm for personal and social life is that 
agape demands heroic accomplishment. One examines 
one's involvements in reciprocal bonds and in the par-
ticular claims and counter-claims of historical existence 
and rejects such a compromised life. A heroic effort is 
made toward purity-the Mother Teresa ideal. (Inci-
dentally, a secular illustration of this occurred in the 
recent BBC rendering of Tender Is the Night, where 
Dick Diver tries to ignore the asymmetrical relation 
with Nicole and to love her with a consistent self-sacri-
ficial love ... with disastrous effects). I do not wish 
to negate such a heroic ethic, but I also do not want 
to allow it to sort out Christians into first-class and sec-
ond-class teams. That is just another way of dissolving 
the tension, leaving the majority of Christians with a 
paralyzing bad conscience. 
There is also a perennial tendency to make agape 
love directly determinative for social ethics. Without 
6Cited by Meilaender, p. 87. 
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going further into it at this point, let me just say that 
such a tendency leads to sentimentality and moralism, 
an occupational hazard for Protestant churches at 
least. 
III 
How, then, should the relation between mutual love 
and Christian love be described? My simple answer is 
that the relation is dialectical. Just as God's action in 
Christ is in a paradoxical and dialectical relationship 
to the fallen creation, so Christian ethics should not 
try to dissolve the tension between mutual and Chris-
tian love, but rather to ensure that the tension is crea-
tive. 
The norm or spirit of Christian love should act as 
both a No and Yes to mutual love. It should serve as 
a constant judgment on our complacencies, a constant 
summons to richer moral possibilities and a standard 
for discriminate decisions. 7 In biblical language, agape 
is "the heaven that leavens the lump," although it is 
not the lump itself. 
Thus, Christian ethics should strongly affirm the 
preferential bonds of friendship and marriage and 
family life, but insist that the exclusiveness involved in 
those bonds not become exclusivistic. The summons of 
agape should be a dynamic force that strains against 
narrow limits, enabling one to be open to all neigh-
bors. Friendship should not snuff out charity. 
Likewise, Christian ethics must gratefully recognize 
humankind as needy creatures who reciprocally give 
and receive, freely and equally. At the same time, they 
must discern that the relations of mutuality are often 
incapable of being created without the initiating qual-
ity of agape, for if we give only to receive, mutual re-
lations are poisoned from the beginning. Further, 
mutuality cannot be sustained without the forgiving 
capacities of agape. In a finite and sinful world, mutu-
ality is fragile and unstable; friendship frequently 
needs an element of unconditional acceptance in order 
to transcend the rupture of finely-honed mutualities. 
Again, there is a yes to the qualities of mutual love, 
but also a recognition that they are not sufficient. 
While Christian ethics affirms mutual love as the 
very stuff of our lives, it also must realistically accept 
its changeableness. As we said earlier, the fittingness 
of being to being changes with altered circumstances 
of life. At the very least, agape encourages one to 
work for the other's good, even when friendship pass-
es. At a higher level, perhaps illustrated best in a solid 
marriage, it adds the tenacity of steadfast commitment 
7These are developed by Reinhold Niebuhr in his Interpre-
tation, pp. 97-123. 
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wherein persons stick with each other through a life-
~ong conversation, <illowing themselves to be changed 
m order to maintain the "fit." 
Agape challenges the myopia and 
defensiveness that is such a temptation 
in our work and our public life. At 
the same time, Christian ethics must 
realistically recognize and affirm 
the particularity and tentative 
autonomy of our worldly tasks. 
Finally a word about vocations, those earthly places 
of particular responsibility. Agape challenges the 
myopia and defensiveness that is such a temptation in 
our work and our public life. At the same time, Chris-
tian ethics must realistically recognize and affirm the 
particularity and tentative autonomy of worldly tasks. 
Agape cannot supplant those. But the freedom of the 
Christian is such that the responsible deed can be 
done somewhere along the continuum between defen-
sive closure and irresponsible openness. There are no 
strict guidelines or rules for such responsibility, 
though there are supports and accountabilities in the 
community of brothers and sisters as they reflect on 
the nature of particular responsibilities. 
IV 
In conclusion, I am arguing that mutual and Chris-
tian love cannot be sorted out as inferior and superior 
types, nor can they be separated. Mutual love provides 
the created texture of life, but it is subject to distortion 
and fracture in our fallen existence. Agape is the chal-
le~ging and healing element that interacts dynamically 
With mutuality. It is, in Anders Nygren's memorable 
i~a~e, the scarlet thread that runs through history, 
bmdmg together that which on its own would disinte-
grate.8 Or to put it another way-Richard Niebuhr's-
God's sovereignity is exercised more through crosses 
than thrones.9 
But t~e relation of mutual love and Christian love 
is never tidy. There is great, but creative, tension be-
tween the two that can best be borne by those who are 
confident that they are justified by grace rather than 
how well they fit the two together, either practically or 
theoretically. Cl 
8 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: SPCK 1957) p 
137. ' ' . 
9H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New 
York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 187. 
8 
It's a Boy! 
(Matthew 1 :1-17) 
He came from a long line of men-
fourteen masculine generations 
from Abraham to David, 
including Judah & Bros., 
then fourteen all-male generations 
from David to the Deportation, 
finally fourteen generations of men 
from the Deportation to Him. 
Through forty generations 
from Abraham to Grandpa Jacob 
(patient Joseph's father), 
only four women were noteworthy 
genealogical by-products: 
"by Tamar," widowed Canaanite 
daughter-in-law of Judah, 
playing the prostitute, 
came Judah's incest twins; 
"by Rahab," Canaanite harlot, 
came Boaz; 
"by Ruth," the Moabite widow 
bought with a parcel of land, 
came Obed; 
"by the wife of Uriah," the soldier 
cuckolded to death, 
came Solomon. 
(These were the noteworthy women.) 
T~en, in the genealogy's penultimate generation, 
m non-male-chauvinist fulfillment, 
comes Joseph as "husband of Mary"-
Joseph, a husband second only to the Holy Ghost, 
deterred from divorce by a dream; 
Joseph, buoyed by the promise, 
"She will bear a Son," 
one with a popular (boy's) name; 
Joseph, step-father to the Christ 
who is the Son of David 
and the Son of Abraham 




FAITH AND LEARNING IN THE 
CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY 
General Reflections and a Cautious Application 
(Editor's Note: This essay was originally presented at a sym-
posium held November 7-8, 1986, at Calvin College. Par-
ticipants attended from Calvin, Valparaiso University, and 
the University of Notre Dame. The general topic considered 
at the symposium was " The Integration of Faith and Learn-
ing in the Disciplines as Reflected in Scholarship and Class-
room Teaching.") 
I have to begin these comments on a confessional 
note. I have been presented to you as a political scien-
tist who will speak on the integration of faith and 
learning in that discipline. But both of those categori-
zations are somewhat misleading and require some 
explanation and elaboration. 
I 
To begin with, I am not actually a political scientist. 
In my undergraduate training at Valparaiso Univer-
sity, I acquired a double major in history and political 
science. I went on to graduate school in the field of 
American studies, where, it is true, I had a minor field 
in American politics-as well as one in American liter-
ature-but where my major field was American his-
tory. After graduate school, I took a teaching job in 
American history at Queen's University in Kingston, 
Ontario, Canada, where I remained for seventeen 
years. In my teaching there, I specialized in twentieth-
century U.S. history. My scholarly interests focused on 
twentieth-century American political thought. 
I returned to Valparaiso University five years ago as 
Editor of The Cresset, a Lutheran Christian journal of 
ideas, and also as a part-time teacher. For reasons of 
James Nuechterlein is Editor of The Cresset and As-
sociate Professor of Political Science at Valparaiso Univer-
sity. 
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convenience, I wound up in the Political Science de-
partment, where I teach courses in political philosophy 
and in modern American political thought. I am thus 
technically a political scientist, in that the Political Sci-
ence department is my academic home- home being 
here described in Robert Frost's sense as the place 
where, when you have to go there, they have to take 
you in. 
But I still bring to my teaching in political science a 
historian's perspective, and historians-even political 
historians- are not political scientists. Some years ago 
C. Vann Woodward, the great historian of the Amer-
ican South, wrote an essay encouraging historians to 
avail themselves of social science methods and perspec-
tives, but he added a cautionary note that struck me 
then as it does today as definitive of the historian's dis-
tinct perspective: "In every true historian there is a 
humanist with a profound respect for the varied par-
ticularity of human experience and a jealous regard 
for the precise integrity of time and place in the re-
membrance of things past." 1 Which, being interpreted, 
is why a historian-at least this historian-can never 
truly be a social scientist. 
It is a little awkward being a humanist in a social sci-
ence department. As I have said to my students, I am 
in the embarrassing position of teaching a discipline in 
whose existence I do not believe. But there it is and 
there I am, and I thought you should be set straight 
as to the tenuous nature of my credentials in political 
science. 
II 
But the problem of possible misrepresentation goes 
1C. Vann Woodward, "The Comparability of American 
History," in C. Vann Woodward, ed., The Comparative Ap-
proach to American History (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 
p. 16. 
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farther and deeper than that. Our general, transdis-
ciplinary topic these two days is the integration of faith 
and learning, and I have to confess that for me the 
degree to which faith and learning can genuinely be 
integrated seems highly problematic. I am a Lutheran 
(indeed, I sometimes think of myself as the last unre-
constructed Lutheran), and so you will not be sur-
prised to hear that I instinctively think of the relation-
ship between faith and learning-or, in H . Richard 
Niebuhr's classic formulation, between Christ and cul-
ture-not in terms of transformation or integration 
but rather in terms of paradox and tension. 
The most venerable view of the 
Christian university sees its 
essential work as "the fusion of high 
intelligence and high religion." 
Perhaps the most venerable view of the Christian 
university sees its essential work as "the fusion of high 
intelligence and high religion." (It was, indeed, pre-
cisely that vision that informed the founding of Christ 
College, the honors college at Valparaiso University.) 
But in the classical Lutheran view, that idea is one of 
those commonplaces that most of us give casual assent 
to but that do not stand up well under close analysis. 
In the Lutheran perspective, faith and learning, while 
they are not ultimately irreconcilable and while, in-
deed, they must for their mutual health inform each 
other at certain points, do exist largely on different 
planes and are incapable of essential fusion or integra-
tion. It is not learning that leads to or sustains faith, 
and learning, for its part, does not rest on faith or re-
quire it for its justification. 
I will not attempt any full theological elaboration of 
the Lutheran position, except to note that it finds its 
roots in Luther's controlling image of the condition of 
humanity as being that of simul justus et peccator, that 
is, the sense that men and women are at once fully sin-
ners and fully saints, and that that paradoxical condi-
tion pervades an · of human nature and culture. 2 Thus 
Luther's ambivalent view of everything human. In that 
ambivalence Luther could, for example, speak harshly 
of reason-the basis of all learning-insofar as it exists 
in respect to faith and as part of a fallen and demonic 
existence: reason, Luther said with characteristic mod-
eration, is "the Devil's Whore," a "beast," an "enemy 
of God," a "source of mischief," "carnal," and "stupid ." 
2For a thoughtful explication of this idea, see Martin E. 
Marty, "Simul: A Lutheran Reclamation Project in the 
Humanities," The Cresset (December, 1981), 7-14. 
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But he truly was ambivalent, not simply condemna-
tory. Within its own sphere and as part of the divinely 
created order, Luther suggested, reason is God's great-
est, indeed inestimable, gift. He in fact personified it 
as the "inventress and mistress of all the arts, of 
medicine and law, of whatever wisdom, power, virtue, 
and glory men possess in this life."3 
If we would maintain the tension Luther suggests, it 
seems to me, we would perforce be skeptical of no-
tions of integrating faith and learning in the academic 
disciplines. Thus we would look questioningly at ideas 
not merely of Christian physics or Christian chemistry 
but also of Christian economics, Christian history, or 
Christian political science. The tension in the very idea 
of a Christian university stems from the fact that such 
an idea suggests the union of two forms of community 
that operate under different imperatives. 
As Alexander Miller has suggested in his useful 
study Faith and Learning, the university is involved in 
an endless quest for truth while Christianity, if it is to 
remain true to itself, must in some sense claim to be 
the truth. The university, the body of learners, is a 
community of inquiry, while the church, the body of 
the faithful, is a community of conviction. Both com-
munities speak of truth, but they do not do so in com-
mensurable ways: the truths of Christianity are gener-
ated from a deeper level than reflection, evidence, and 
logic, and they are not the same as the truths of 
philosophy or science.4 
In the community of faith we speak necessarily-if, 
one hopes, cautiously and with humility-of orthodoxy 
and heresy; in the community of learning such ideas 
are properly anathema. In the university reason must 
be the only arbiter and have unlimited sway, and it 
cannot do so if those whose job it is to safeguard or-
thodoxy attempt to act on their knowledge of reason's 
potentially corrosive effect on faith by putting it under 
restraints and prohibitions. John Henry Newman, who 
surely understood reason's limits and dangers, 
nonetheless also understood that a university must live 
with the risks of reason let loose: " ... if we invite 
reason to take its place in our schools, we must let 
reason have fair and full play. If we reason, we must 
submit to the conditions of reason. We cannot use it 
by halves .... "5 
The tensions between the differing imperatives of 
faith and learning thus create perplexing dilemmas for 
the Christian university. Professor Miller, for example, 
a deeply committed Christian, is nonetheless led by the 
3Quoted in ibid., 12-13. 
4Alexander Miller, Faith and Learning (New York: Asso-
ciation Press, 1960), pp. 82-83. 
5Quoted in ibid. , p. 194. 
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logic of his belief in the necessary autonomy and 
supremacy of reason within its sphere to conclude that 
no university, including no Christian university, may 
properly impose confessional tests in hiring its faculty: 
" ... faculty appointments should be made purely on 
scholarly merit, with due regard to wholesome variety 
of conviction, but without any striving after an en-
gineered orthodoxy."6 Miller is clearly uncomfortable 
with where his logic has led him-given his view, it is 
difficult to see how over time a Christian university 
could continue to remain Christian in any coherent 
sense of the term-and he rather lamely concedes that 
a church body may continue to secure control of a 
university under its jurisdiction by "retaining certain 
key positions in the hands of believing men." He im-
plicitly acknowledges the corner he has painted him-
self into by immediately adding to this concession the 
comment that "I cannot be too thankful that I am not 
an Administrator responsible for deciding what these 
positions are ."7 
The problems encountered in the tension between 
faith and learning are hardly novel; those problems 
tell part-though by no means not all-of the story of 
the evolution of American higher education from its 
religious origins to its present secular condition. That 
story is too well known to require retelling here, but 
I do want to pass on two recent sightings by Stanley 
Hauerwas that dramatize just how far many American 
universities have travelled from where they began and 
how embarrassed they are by their points of origin.8 
The first involves an incident at Duke University, 
where Professor Hauerwas presently teaches. Like 
many universities, Duke has set a bronze plaque at the 
center of its campus recalling the purposes of the uni-
versity's founders, and that statement of purpose is 
read on certain high ceremonial occasions. Duke's 
statement is mostly unexceptionable for modern 
academics: it speaks of advancing learning, defending 
scholarship, developing a love of freedom and truth, 
promoting a spirit of tolerance, etc. But at the very be-
ginning of the statement stands a distinct awkward-
ness. The very first aim set forth for Duke University 
is to "assert a faith in the eternal union of knowledge 
and religion set forth in the teachings and character of 
Jesus Christ, the son of God." At the recent inaugura-
tion of Duke's President, when the chairman of the 
Board of Trustees read the statement, he omitted the 
offending passage. 
The second sign of the times Hauerwas alerts us to 
6/bid., p. 178. 
7Loc. cit. 
8Stanley Hauerwas, "How Christian Universities Contrib-
ute to the Corruption of Youth: Church and University 
in a Confused Age," Katallagete (Summer, 1986), 21-28. 
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concerns Harvard University. Contemporary versions 
of the Harvard shield indicate that its motto is the sim-
ple word Veritas. But, Hauerwas informs us, the full 
motto of the university actually reads Veritas: Christo et 
Ecclesia. So at Harvard the truth that was originally to 
be pursued for Christ and the church now presumably 
exists only for its own, purely secular, sake. 
Such stories may amuse us and confirm our sense of 
where universities have come to, but they hardly sur-
prise us. And if the case I have been making for the 
problematic nature of the relationship between faith 
and learning has any merit, one might well argue that 
the path that the Dukes and the Harvards have taken 
is both understandable and correct, a cause for regret 
only to those awash in reactionary nostalgia for a van-
ished pre-modern past. If we do not lament the pass-
ing of the age of Christendom, why mourn the demise 
of the Christian university, especially if the very 
phrase Christian university constitutes, if not quite an 
oxymoron, at least a term with little substantive con-
tent? 
Presumably those of us in this gathering would 
demur from that judgment. Even my own somewhat 
skeptical view of the integration of faith and learning, 
you will note, has included the escape clause that the 
two, for their mutual health, should inform each other 
at certain points. How then might a modest recon-
struction of the idea of the Christian university and of 
the relationship between faith and learning proceed? 
III 
We might begin where every discussion of university 
affairs in America seems to begin these days, with the 
matter of values. We have to be very careful here, I 
think. There is, in some circles, a kind of creeping 
Christian arrogance that appears to assume that we 
are the only people concerned with moral values or 
equipped to deal with them. From that questionable 
assumption there easily develops the notion that Chris-
tian universities hold some sort of patent on "character 
formation" or concern for the "whole person." The 
temptation so to view ourselves is compounded by our 
knowledge that it is precisely these matters that cur-
rently preoccupy parents and alumni. It is embarrass-
ing but true that significant parts of our constituency 
care less about our academic standing than about our 
capacity to insure the moral sturdiness and/or theolog-
ical orthodoxy of the coming generation. 
But if we must be cautious here, we need not be 
apologetic. If we are not unique in our concern for 
moral values, we do hold an advantage over secular in-
stitutions in that we operate from a more-or-less un-
ified core of values that they either do not share or, 
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even if they do, they cannot claim. Most Americans 
still anchor their moral values in religious beliefs. 
Christian universities can talk about such things and 
operate from them in ways that secular universities, 
for a whole variety of reasons, cannot. 
In my view, the Christian university is perhaps not 
so much a place of Christian learning as it is a commu-
nity of Christian learners. And a community of Chris-
tian learners should be a place where, whatever else 
occurs, the people involved treat each other with the 
distinctive love, forgiveness, and concern for the other 
that ought to mark the Christian life. (This idea of the 
Christian university as a community of Christian learn-
ers, incidentally, could have extricated Professor Miller 
from the awkward position he got himself into over 
the matter of faculty hiring.) 
Here again, though, we must be careful. The Chris-
tian university will be concerned with the co-curricular 
life of the entire community, but that cannot be its dis-
tinctive focus. We do not exist, after all, for the pur-
pose of running the equivalent of a post-adolescent 
Christian day camp. The informed heart is doubtless 
of greater importance in the ultimate Christian scheme 
of things than is the educated mind, but it is the latter 
which is the proper central concern of the university. 
A Christian university that is long on piety but short 
on learning can no more justify itself than can a Chris-
tian hospital where the members of the medical staff 
have rich devotional lives but are not quite up to snuff 
on recent developments in health care. 
Yet the matter of values is not dissociated from the 
intellectual life of the university. Christian universities, 
because they operate within a coherent frame of 
values, can place learning in context and perspective 
in a way that students seek and that, again, secular in-
stitutions find it difficult to know even how to ap-
proach. Students, like all the rest of us, are meaning-
seeking creatures; because Christian universities are 
openly concerned with questions of ultimate purpose 
and transcendent value, we can respond to student 
concerns about questions which public institutions, 
when they recognize them at all, can only relegate to 
the realm of the ineffable. Secular universities are in-
clined to talk about religion only in historical, clinical, 
positivist, or reductionist ways; we, on the other hand, 
have the great advantage of being able to talk about 
God without changing the subject. 
Stanley Hauerwas has raised the issue of values as 
they relate to the intellectual life of the university in 
an intriguing context that might amplify our discus-
sion here.9 Much of the teaching life of the modern 
university, Hauerwas notes, proceeds according to the 
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Socratic method of critical inquiry, which claims a 
moral value of its own. The task of the university, in 
this view, is not to provide students with answers but 
to make them unrelenting questioners of all un-
examined assumptions or items of conventional wis-
dom. That process takes on moral stature as it makes 
students practitioners of the examined life and thus, 
presumably, more self-conscious and perceptive moral 
agents. 
What is generally overlooked, Hauerwas claims (in 
an argument borrowed from Martha Nussbaum), is 
that the Socratic method can itself lead in dubious 
moral directions. If placed in the hands of those lack-
ing a secure moral foundation, the Socratic dialectic 
can turn its practitioners into cynics adept at under-
mining all forms of conventional morality (insofar as 
they cannot be rationally justified) but with nothing to 
put in conventional morality's place. According to this 
view, Socrates was dangerously indifferent to the an-
tecedent moral training of those he engaged in dialec-
tic. He gave intellectual weapons to those who, lacking 
habituation in the moral virtues, could easily come to 
mistake intellectual cleverness for moral perception. 
The Hauerwas/Nussbaum argument (which I have 
barely sketched here) certainly corresponds to much of 
what I experience with my better students. It is all too 
easy-it may, indeed, be a natural process of intellec-
tual development-for bright students to go through a 
debunking, scoffing, skeptical phase, one in which 
they meet Oscar Wilde's definition of the cynic as the 
person who knows the price of everything and the 
value of nothing. At a debased level, the Socratic style 
of relentless questioning may contribute to the abiding 
sin of most students I encounter, which is not the 
blind dogmatism or even bland indifference that one 
hears so much of, but rather the maddening, mindless 
relativism that debases tolerance and that manages to 
avoid serious engagement with substantive moral and 
intellectual questions by instant retreat to the impreg-
nable fortress of "well, it all depends on your point of 
view." 
Should not Christian universities be better 
positioned than secular universities to avoid or at least 
know how to deal with this form of corruption of 
youth? The point of course is not to discard the So-
cratic method but rather to undergird dialectical in-
quiry with the presumption that one is asking ques-
tions not simply in order to uncover intellectual weak-
nesses, expose unexamined premises, and probe tradi-
tional authority but in order finally, having done all 
these things, to be led to dependable answers. And 
one can only lead students to find answers if one be-
lieves oneself that answers do in fact exist, and exist 
at a level somewhat more substantial than that of 
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"whatever works for you." 
There is more that could be said here, but I want 
to extend the discussion a step further by borrowing 
the arguments of yet another scholar who has pon-
dered the purposes of the Christian university, in this 
case my colleague, Mark Schwehn. 10 
Schwehn attempts to outline the distinctive perspec-
tive of the Christian scholar by setting it over against 
what he calls "Weberianism," a construct built on his 
reading of Max Weber's famous essay, "Science as a 
Vocation." Weber there argued that "the fate of our 
times is characterized by rationalization and intellec-
tualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of 
the world.' Precisely the ultimate and most sublime 
values have retreated from public life either into the 
transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brother-
liness of direct and personal human relations." 
The university partakes centrally in this process of 
intellectualization, which has at its core the assumption 
that we can "in principle master all things by calcula-
tion." The end of academic life for the Weberian uni-
versity, then, according to Schwehn's reading, is noth-
ing less than mastery of the world, which is effected 
by scholars engaged in endless efforts to extend the 
limits of their disciplines. 
The Weberian university, existing as it does in a dis-
enchanted scientific world, has a purely instrumental 
approach to knowledge and rigorously limits the kinds 
of questions it supposes it can or should undertake to 
answer. 
Thus . . . the natural scientist teaches us what we 
must do if we wish to master life technically, but he can-
not and hence should not consider the question of 
whether it ultimately makes sense to do so .... The his-
torical and cultural sciences teach us to understand and 
interpret literary and social phenomena, but they dare 
not ask whether any given phenomenon is worthwhile. 
In sum, the academician may clarify values but he dare 
not promulgate them within the walls of academe .... 
"Academic pleading [about ultimate questions] is mean-
ingless in principle because the various value spheres of 
the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each 
other." ... Academics may not qua academics examine 
ultimate questions, because there can be no academic 
justification for any answer they might give to such 
questions. 
Christian universities, Schwehn suggests, have the 
complex challenge of resisting this process of positivist 
Weberian intellectualization without retreating into 
anti-intellectualism or religious authoritarianism: "If 
these institutions fail to resist total intellectualization of 
10Mark Schwehn, "Academics as a Vocation-11: Tradi-
tion and the Individual Professor," The Cresset (May, 
1985), 5-10. 
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the sort that Weber describes, they will soon cease to 
be Christian in any intelligible sense of the word. If, 
on the other hand, they fail to maintain their commit-
ments to free and open inquiry, they will soon cease 
to be universities and colleges." 
The Christian university's challenge to its Weberian 
counterpart, Schwehn argues, should begin with the 
Weberian claim that we can "in principle master all 
things by calculation." Christians, on the basis of the 
biblical stories that "both form and inform them," 
know that claim to be false. They know from their 
reading of the Genesis story that humanity's fallen 
condition stems precisely from "the repeated efforts of 
human creatures to usurp the place of the Creator." 
Any presumption of total human mastery through 
human reason is "diabolical." This Christian insight is 
central. 
The Christian school that begins with a sense of the 
limits of academic learning will not be tempted to con-
strue the character of academic life as progressing ad in-
finitum toward increasing mastery of the world. Indeed, 
this characterization of academics should remind the 
Christian of the story of the tower of Babel: academics 
devote themselves entirely to making monographic 
bricks that will be superseded by other bricks and then 
others and then still others in an ever-ascending struc-
ture of knowledge. The Christian university, because of 
its constitutive convictions about the limits of human in-
tellectual powers, will replace the Weberian image of 
specialized workers constructing a tower with an image 
of a community enriching and thereby extending a con-
versation. This latter image of the Christian university 
calls attention to its traditional character, as opposed to 
the anti-traditional character of the Weberian academy. 
The Christian university feels obliged or should feel 
obliged to maintain a living relationship to its past. It 
seeks to think not only about its past but with it as well. 
The Weberian academy, by contrast, denies that one 
can do both of these things at one and the same time. 
To think about a text and to think with it: this is con-
versation. To think only about a text and to claim that 
one cannot responsibly think with it as an academic: this 
is Weberianism. The Weberian academic asks only 
whether what someone says about what a text means is 
true or false. The Christian academic asks this question 
too, but he may also ask whether what a given text says 
about what we are to do and how we are to live is true 
or false. Christian academics may not and probably will 
not agree about the answers to these questions, but they 
can and should agree, against the Weberians, that such 
questions should be asked and answered within the 
academy. 
I have considerably abbreviated and foreshortened 
Schwehn's argument, but I hope I have communicated 
the sense of it. It needs, I think, no further gloss. It 
suggests, to my mind, a picture of a Christian univer-
sity as a place where Christian learners engage in lib-
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era! learning informed by the Christian faith. 
That engagement is not without tensions and com-
plications: the Christian intellectual, while he must at 
certain points reject the message of modernity, has 
himself necessarily made the journey through moder-
nity, and he cannot, without self-deception, suppose 
he has come through the journey untouched and un-
affected. The Christian intellectual's mentality is post-
modern, not pre-modern, and that makes the Chris-
tian intellectual life a good deal more ambiguous and 
equivocal than it otherwise would be. To get beyond 
Weber, we must first go through Weber, and even 
after we have passed him by, a significant part of him 
will forever remain with us. 
IV 
Some of you may be wondering by now when if ever 
I intend to descend from the ethereal realms of high 
generalization and come to grips with the topic as-
signed and announced: the integration of faith and 
learning in the disciplines, in this case, the discipline 
of political science. Given my confession that I am not 
truly a political scientist and that I am skeptical of the 
degree to which faith and learning can be integrated, 
you will perhaps understand my reluctance to get to 
the point. · 
But I do not mean to dodge entirely, and I have by 
now, I hope, sufficiently made clear my view that 
short of integration there are still things that faith and 
learning have to say to each other. As I reflect on the 
effects of my Lutheran Christian beliefs on my 
academic work in modern American political thought, 
I am led to two disparate conclusions: 1) there has 
never been any explicit intrusion of distinctively Chris-
tian views into anything I have ever written-at least 
at the scholarly level-on American political life and 
thought; and yet, 2) virtually everything I have ever 
thought or written on modern American politics has 
been thoroughly informed, indeed pervaded, by Lu-
theran presuppositions. Before I expand on that, allow 
me a brief excursus on some recent disputes over 
political thought in the field of political science. 
The Weberian perspective sketched by Mark 
Schwehn has had its impact in political science as else-
where. Indeed, ever since Thomas Hobbes outlined 
his emotive theory of value in the seventeenth century, 
the positivist influence has been on the advance. 
Hobbes was a modernist before his time: judgments of 
good and evil, he argued, have nothing to do with the 
inherent qualities of the beliefs or actions to which 
they are applied; they are simply expressions of our 
feelings about those ideas and beliefs. In Hobbes' own 
words: " ... whatsoever is the object of any man's ap-
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petite or desire, that is it which he for his part calls 
good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and 
of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words 
of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with re-
lation to the person that uses them: there being noth-
ing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of 
good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the ob-
jects themselves." 
That perspective found major reinforcement in 
modern times with the development of the whole idea 
of social science and the rise in its wake of empirical 
political analysis. As political science rose in esteem, 
political thought fell. Political philosophy never entirely 
disappeared from political science curricula, but it cer-
tainly declined in significance, and the field itself was 
increasingly defined in empirical, as opposed to nor-
mative, terms. 
The Christian intellectual, while he 
must at certain points reject the 
message of modernity, has himself 
necessarily made the journey through 
it, and he hasn't done so untouched. 
In recent years, the pos1Uv1st impulse has come 
under increasing attack; as noted earlier, people are 
suddenly interested in values again. The attacks came 
from Leo Strauss and his disciples on the right, who 
expressed utter disdain for the very idea of a natural 
science of politics and urged in its stead a return to 
serious consideration of Platonic forms of the Good, as 
well as from groups on the left like the Caucus for a 
New Politics, which depicted the pretensions of scien-
tific analysis of process and power as a form of mys-
tification whose effect, if not always intent, was to pro-
vide support for the existing socio-political system. 
Criticism came as well, of course, from people with no 
particular ideological or disciplinary axe to grind who 
simply concluded that empirical political analysis left 
too many essential questions unanswered-or even un-
asked. 
This rising tide of discontent helps explain the ex-
traordinary success of John Rawls' A Theory of justice, 
which appeared in 1971. It is not too much to say that 
Rawls' book virtually by itself resuscitated the field of 
normative political theory. Much of the acclaim for the , 
work stemmed from its intrinsic merit-Rawls' is an 
extraordinarily rich analysis-but it stemmed as well 
from Rawls' managing to raise, in intellectually re-
spectable terms, questions of value, to reestablish an 
intelligible relationship between fact and value, the is 
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and the ought. Through the use of a device borrowed 
from game theory, Rawls built a bridge between 
analytical and normative analysis. Since the appear-
ance of A Theory of justice, normative theory has en-
joyed a steady, if modest, revival. 
End of excursus . . . and return to how Lutheran 
presuppositions have informed my own very modest 
attempts to think-admittedly in a normative as well as 
analytic manner-about modern American political 
thought. I propose very briefly to sketch not what I 
have written on the subject-that would be too self-ref-
erential an exercise-but rather the Lutheran assump-
tions that have led me to think the way I do. I want 
to outline, in other words, a Lutheran approach to 
politics-note, please, that I stipulate a Lutheran ap-
proach, not the Lutheran approach. Had I not so 
stipulated, I am sure that at least some of my Valpa-
raiso colleagues-who for reasons that I find incom-
prehensible find my politics uncongenial-would have 
hastened to stipulate in my stead. I will not insist that 
my approach to politics is the only valid one from Lu-
theran assumptions, but I do claim it as the most ven-
erable in the tradition. 
The Lutheran understanding of politics rests on the 
doctrine of the two kingdoms, which in turn can be 
seen as the natural correlative of the characteristic Lu-
theran distinction between law and gospel. Two king-
doms thought, of course, is not original with Luther: 
he took the concept over from St. Augustine, though 
he modified it in ways I have not the time to spell out 
here. Both kingdoms, Luther said, belong to God and 
are answerable to him; but he rules over them under 
different rubrics. They exist in dialectical relationship 
to each other, as befits the simul nature of the human 
condition. They cannot entirely be separated because 
the Christian lives in both, but they can be distin-
guished in principle and function . 
In the kingdom of the right hand, the realm of the 
gospel, the governing principle is love, and the king-
dom lives according to grace. The kingdom of the left 
hand, in which politics resides, is the kingdom of law. 
Its governing principle is justice and it has a legiti-
mate, indeed necessary, place for the exercise of 
power and coercion. The Christian magistrate need 
feel no bad conscience when in his official capacity he 
refuses to forgive seventy times seven or to turn the 
other cheek. The left-hand kingdom must be run ac-
cording to the law because of the persistence and per-
vasiveness of sin. Because of sin, Luther concluded, it 
is neither necessary nor even possible to run the state 
by the gospel: " ... a man who would venture to gov-
ern an entire country or the world with the gospel 
would be like a shepherd who would place in one pen 
wolves, lions, eagles, and sheep together and let them 
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freely mingle with one another and say, Help your-
selves, and be good and peaceful among yourselves. 
. . . The sheep, forsooth, would keep the peace and 
would allow themselves to be ... governed in peace, 
but they would not live long .... " 
We are all familiar with the charges brought against 
this view. Let me quickly review them and respond to 
them. The fundamental charge is that Lutheranism in-
eluctably intends to otherworldliness, quietism, exces-
sive preoccupation with order-in a word, conserv-
atism. 
The simplest thing to say in response to the claim 
that two kingdoms thought conduces to political con-
servatism is that it's not necessarily so. 11 If we are to 
place the blame for German conservatism in the 1930s 
on Lutheran theology, what are we to say of the left-
wing political cultures of the Scandinavian nations, 
countries whose religious traditions were more 
thoroughly Lutheran than was ever the case in Ger-
many? Those inclined to draw direct lines from 
Luther to Hitler need to remind themselves of the un-
certain relationship between religious faith and politi-
cal practice as well as of the variables other than reli-
gion that enter into political choice. In any case, Lu-
therans have been-and still are--diverse enough in 
their political preferences to bring into serious ques-
tion any reductionist theory of Lutheranism's neces-
sary conservatism. 
Considered without prejudice, two kingdoms 
thought is not essentially quietist. That charge arises 
from the mistaken assumption that in insisting on the 
integrity and supremacy of the gospel, Lutherans 
thereby denigrate all those areas of life that fall within 
the kingdom of the left hand. Yet to say that some-
thing is not of ultimate significance is not at all to 
deny its penultimate urgency. If Christians must of 
necessity love God and the gospel of forgiveness in 
Jesus Christ above all else, that is not to say that by 
that token they reduce to insignificance all those God-
given gifts that provide life its sweetness and savor: 
family, friends, career, community. There is in fact 
nothing in Lutheran thought that would lead Chris-
tians to suppose that they can love God and yet de-
spise the world in which he has placed us. 
There is no way for Christians to ignore or 
minimize politics. Since politics is important to our 
lives, it will perforce be important to our lives as 
Christians. We must, if we take our faith seriously, 
apply it in a serious way to the things that make a dif-
11The analysis below follows closely arguments I have 
made elsewhere: "Luther's Thought and Lutherans' Poli-
tics," The Cresset (September, 1983), 19-21; and "Must Lu-
therans Be Political Conservatives?" Forum Letter (Oc-
tober, 1984), 7-8. 
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ference to us, and politics, whether we want it to or 
not, does make a difference. The kingdom of the left 
hand remains God's kingdom. 
A variation on the charge of quietism brought 
against the two kingdoms notion involves what its crit-
ics take to be its unduly negative emphasis. Luther 
regularly spoke of government in the context of its 
duty to preserve order in a fallen world, and one can 
easily get from him an idea of the state as simply a 
necessary evil, brought into being and finding its jus-
tification solely as a device to keep peace among sinful 
men and women who would , in its absence, tear each 
other and the social fabric apart. Thus it is a tempta-
tion for Lutherans to think of secular rule almost ex-
clusively in terms of coercion, prohibition, and re-
straint and to fail to appreciate its positive and creative 
uses. 
Luther, of course, is hardly alone in his emphasis on 
government's role as preserver of social peace. The 
idea that government exists first of all to preserve 
order is a commonplace of political philosophy. Yet it 
may be that Lutherans are excessively inclined to stress 
this negative, if essential, function of the state and less 
ready than they should be to take a more expansive 
and generous view of its purposes. The heirs of 
Luther have perhaps failed adequately to translate his 
political prescriptions into terms appropriate to a mod-
ern and democratic political system that the reformer 
himself had no way of imagining or anticipating. 
Here is a case where the antidote to Luther may be 
found in Luther himself, specifically in his doctrine of 
vocation. The teaching that it is the Christian's duty 
and joy to serve God and neighbor in the place in 
which God has placed him has obvious implications for 
the role of the modern Christian as democratic citizen. 
The application of the doctrine of vocation to the no-
tion of the two kingdoms can free Lutheran political 
thought of negative and restrictive connotations and 
provide all the theological justification that any Chris-
tian activist could wish for. In the process, it can also 
lay to rest the idea that two kingdoms thought leads 
inexorably to political conservatism. 
It is tempting to rest the matter there, secure in the 
assurance that the doctrine of the two kingdoms has 
been shown to be free of ideological taint. But the 
matter is not quite that simple. Lutherans need not be 
political conservatives, but they may naturally be in-
clined to be philosophical conservatives. The Augustin-
ian strain of piety emphasizes that any social system 
will necessarily bear the marks of sin and finitude . Lu-
therans may be many things politically, but they can-
not be utopians. They will look on promises of new 
political orders and new breeds of humanity with in-
stinctive skepticism. Lutherans need in no way be inhib-
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ited from struggling for social justice, but they will 
never fall prey to the superstition that humanity's alien-
ation is simply a function of inadequate social arrange-
ments. 
Even as the gospel spurs among Lutherans a re-
sponse of love that will, where appropriate, take polit-
ical forms , it simultaneously reminds them of the con-
tingent and proximate nature of politics, and thus of 
its limits. Lutherans, even in their most intense mo-
ments of social engagement, will remain in some sense 
other-minded. They will never fail to distinguish their 
vision of the present and coming kingdom of grace 
from any existing or potential political order; they will 
refuse, in short, to immanentize the eschaton. As 
Luther understood, eschatological urges in politics 
tend to pose dangers for sheep. 
If one holds to the set of views just outlined, one is 
predisposed along certain lines of political analysis, re-
gardless of the particular culture, period, or political 
system under consideration. You should not find it 
difficult to guess, for example, how I came out in my 
analysis of New Left political thought of the 1960s. 
Nor should you be surprised to learn that George 
McGovern was, in terms of political philosophy, my 
least favorite presidential candidate of recent times. 
(McGovern traced his political ideas to what Lutherans 
are bound to perceive as the illusions of the social gos-
pel.) 
Yet, as already suggested, the movement from 
theological perceptions to political theory is not neces-
sarily direct, unambiguous, or predetermined. One's 
theology does not write one's political analysis. Many 
who hold the kinds of views I have outlined are con-
servatives, but then one thinks of a Reinhold Niebuhr, 
who while not a Lutheran held enough Lutheran-like 
views to be accorded honorary fellowship, and who re-
mained throughout his life a man of the left. 
It seems to me that the forces that shape our 
academic thought and work are far too complex, dis-
parate-and often rightfully secular-for us to be able 
to talk easily of the integration of faith and learning. 
As with the two kingdoms, things that can never en-
tirely be separated can and often must be distin-
guished. 
And yet, of course, it would be a very peculiar re-
ligious faith that had no discernible effect at all on the 
way we think about the world. Men and women of 
faith will not simply on that account agree about the 
condition and shape of culture, but they will agree-at 
least in essential terms-about the nature and destiny 
of humanity, and what one thinks about where the 
world is ultimately headed will necessarily have some 
effect on (even if it will not determine) one's views as 
to where it has been in the past and where it is now. Cl 
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REALISM RECONSIDERED 
Morgenthau, Kennan, Niebuhr, and Voegelin 
The school of realism in the study of international 
politics reached its zenith about 1950, when the era of 
bipolarity and atomic power had just begun, when the 
basic similarities between our erstwhile totalitarian ally 
and our erstwhile totalitarian foe were becoming clear, 
and when it was common to perceive the hopes of the 
previous half century for perpetual peace as illusory. 
Today, although the conditions of international life re-
main very much the same, realism is not so popular as 
it was. It may be helpful, therefore, to recall it as it 
used to be. 
The middle of the century was the time of a great 
flowering of political thought in this country. A 
number of the contributions were initially made dur-
ing the late 1940s and early 1950s as lectures under 
the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation at 
the University of Chicago. Included in this group were 
contributions to democratic theory by Jacques Maritain 
and Yves R. Simon, as well as analyses by Leo Strauss 
and Eric Voegelin of the spirit of the times and how 
it developed. 
This spirit, as defined by Voegelin, was manifested 
in international politics in what one major realist, 
Hans]. Morgenthau, called utopianism, and another, 
George F. Kennan, called the legalistic-moralistic ap-
proach to international problems; and Morgenthau 
and Kennan decried utopianism, and the legalistic-
moralistic approach, in works also presented initially as 
Walgreen Foundation lectures.* 
Morgenthau and Kennan were two of the three 
great American realists. The third was Reinhold 
Niebuhr. This article will look first at the ways in 
which these three defined realism, and then suggest 
that Morgenthau's realism rested on a too pessimistic 
Glenn N. Schram teaches Political Science at Marquette 
University and has written articles and reviews for a number 
of journals. His most recent contribution to The Cresset, 
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view of human nature and Kennan's on a too optimis-
tic view, and that the chief lesson to be learned from 
the three is their critique of what Voegelin would have 
called gnosticism in international politics. 
*Other Walgreen lectures were a second series by Strauss, 
on Machiavelli; a third series on democracy, by John H. 
Hallowell; and a series by Kurt Riezler on governmental 
decision-making in modern society. Except for Riezler's 
lectures, which were printed in January 1954 in the jour-
nal Ethics (Vol. 64, No. 2, Part II, pp. 1-55), the Walgreen 
lectures were published as books as follows: Jacques Mar-
itain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1951); Yves R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Gov-
ernment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Leo 
Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953); Eric Voegelin, The New Science of 
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Hans 
J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); George F. Kennan, Amer-
ican Diplomacy, I900-I950 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1951); Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glen-
coe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); and John H. Hallowell, The 
Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1954). Kennan's book was reprinted with two 
new chapters in 1984. (Clinton Rossiter's The American 
Presidency [New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956] was also 
presented intially as a series of Walgreen lectures, but it 
lacks the philosophical interest of the other works.) 
Other books referred to in this article are Edward H. 
Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955); Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century (abridged edi-
tion) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); 
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of 
Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944); 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems 
(New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1953); Reinhold 
Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1952); and Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis 
(Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1966). The discussion below of 
Morgenthau's views on the nature of politics is based on 
Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Evil of Politics and the Ethics 
of Evil," Ethics, Vol. 56, No. 1 (October 1945), pp. 1-18. 
For further details on the problem of Kennan and the 
American self-interpretation, also discussed below, see my 
article "George F. Kennan and the Current Civil Theol-
ogy," Center journal, Vol. 2, No.4 (Fall 1983), pp. 67-77. 
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For the clearest and most concise account of realism 
by Morgenthau we must turn, not to his Walgreen lec-
tures, but to his Politics in the Twentieth Century. Here 
he speaks of the "history of modern political thought" 
as "the story of a contest between two schools which 
differ fundamentally in their conception of the nature 
of man, society, and politics." The schools are realism 
and utopianism. This characterization of modern polit-
ical thought is not altogether accurate, but the contest 
to which Morgenthau refers does exist in the field of 
international politics. In examining his juxtaposition of 
the tenets of the two schools, we shall gain an under-
standing of his conception of realism. 
Utopianism "believes that a rational and moral polit-
ical order, derived from universally valid abstract prin-
ciples, can be achieved here and now"; realism "be-
lieves that the world, imperfect as it is from the ra-
tional point of view, is the result of forces inherent in 
human nature." Utopianism assumes that human na-
ture is infinitely malleable and trusts in education, re-
form, and the sporadic use of force to attain its ends; 
realism holds that one must work with human nature, 
not against it, "through the ever temporary balancing 
of interests and the ever precarious settlement of con-
flicts." In international politics realism encourages the 
pursuit of the national interest, which "encompasses 
the integrity of the nation's territory, of its political in-
stitutions, and of its culture." 
Although in the discussion just quoted Morgenthau 
pits realism against utopianism alone, in the book 
based on his Walgreen lectures, In Defense of the Na-
tional Interest, he speaks of utopianism as but one of 
four interrelated errors of American foreign policy 
during World War II and the immediate postwar 
period. The other errors were legalism, which looked 
forward to world order through world law; sentimen-
talism, according to which the national interest was un-
worthy to be a goal of foreign policy and should be re-
placed by the pursuit of universal moral values; and 
neoisolationism, which held that America could attain 
its foreign-policy aims without recourse to traditional 
methods of diplomacy. 
Turning to Kennan, we find that his realism is dis-
tinguished not so much by a set of precepts juxtaposed 
to the legalistic-moralistic approach as by sheer oppo-
sition to it. In the book based on his Walgreen lec-
tures, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, he says of the 
legalistic-moralistic approach: 
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It is the essence of this belief that, instead of taking the 
awkward conflicts of national interest and dealing with 
them on their merits with a view to finding the solu-
tions least unsettling to the stability of international life, 
it would be better to find some formal criteria of a 
juridical nature by which the permissible behavior of 
states could be defined. 
Kennan maintains that the legalistic-moralistic ap-
proach "runs like a red skein through our foreign pol-
icy" of the first half of the twentieth century. Its great-
est defect, he says, is its moralism. "Whoever says 
there is a law must of course be indignant against the 
lawbreaker and feel a moral superiority to him." The 
result is that when a conflict leads to war there is a de-
mand for the complete subjection or the unconditional 
surrender of the lawbreaker. 
Kennan comes closest to offering an alternative to 
the legalistic-moralistic approach at the end of these 
deliberations, where he writes, "[I]f our own purposes 
and undertakings here at home are decent ones, un-
sullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people 
or delusions of superiority, then the pursuit of our na-
tional interest can never fail to be conducive to a bet-
ter world." One may wonder, however, whether this 
aspiration is altogether realistic-a problem which 
brings us to Niebuhr. 
Niebuhr distinguishes realism from idealism, the lat-
ter corresponding to utopianism in Morgenthau's 
thought and the legalistic-moralistic approach in Ken-
nan's work. According to Niebuhr, "In political and 
moral theory 'realism' denotes the disposition to take 
all factors in a social and political situation, which 
offer resistance to established norms, into account, 
particularly the factors of self-interest and power." 
Idealism is disposed to ignore or be indifferent to such 
factors. "This disposition," he says, IS general 
whenever men are inclined to take the moral preten-
sions of themselves or their fellowmen at face value; 
for the disposition to hide self-interest behind the 
facade of pretended devotion to values, transcending 
self-interest, is well-nigh universal." 
Although Niebuhr sometimes wrote as if he believed 
that any pursuit of the national interest in Morgen-
thau's sense was sinful, what he probably meant was 
that sin enters into the pursuit when a nation attaches 
greater weight to its interest than in justice it deserves, 
or when a nation overextends its capabilities in pursu-
ing its interest. In any case Niebuhr thought sin to be 
frequently involved in the pursuit of the national in-
terest, and here he departed from Kennan's apparent 
belief that arrogance, hostility, and a sense of 
superiority could be removed from foreign affairs. 
As for the day-to-day conduct of these affairs, 
Morgenthau preferred the pursuit of the national in-
terest through traditional methods of diplomacy, par-
ticularly the balance-of-power approach; unfortunately 
his use of the term "balance of power" was ambiguous, 
and the fact was fully exploited by his critics. Kennan 
espoused a high-minded conception of national pur-
The Cresset 
pose at variance with Niebuhr's belief that the actions 
of all nations tend to be tainted by sin. Niebuhr was 
wary of a too uncritical acceptance of Morgenthau's 
view, arguing "that a nation that is too preoccupied 
with its own interests is bound to define those interests 
too narrowly," for "it will fail to consider those of its 
interests which are bound up in a web of mutual interests 
with other nations" (the emphasis is Niebuhr's). 
The chief objects of realist criticism at midcentury 
were the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson and Cor-
dell Hull. An admirer of Wilson's, Edward H. 
Buehrig, said thirty years ago in an unusually well-
written book on Wilson's foreign policy that the work 
of Morgenthau and Kennan had had a beneficial ef-
fect in stimulating a reassessment of American diplo-
macy during World War I. Buehrig referred specifi-
cally to the realist view that the correct policy for Wil-
son "would have been calculation and restraint aimed 
at ending the war as soon as possible without catas-
trophe to either side, thereby preserving a balance in 
Europe which would least disturb the outside world 
and contribute most to the future stability and pacifi-
cation of Europe itself." 
When we look at the assumptions underlying the 
realists' works, we find that Morgenthau had a more 
pessimistic view of human nature than even Niebuhr 
had. Morgenthau believed that politics is evil to the 
degree to which its essence and aim are "power over 
man," because it thereby degrades man to a means for 
other men; that "[t]he test of a morally good action is 
the degree to which it is capable of treating others not 
as means to the actor's ends but as ends in them-
selves"; and that politics at best involves the choice of 
the least evil among several possible actions. 
Surely it cannot be true that every attempt to im-
pose one human will on another is evil. One need 
think only of the wise exercise of parental authority or 
the attempt to prevent a tyranny from expanding its 
area of domination. The means by which an attempt 
of this kind is undertaken may be unwise and tainted 
by sin, but the attempt need not be inherently evil. 
Even Kant, whose thought Morgenthau's views so very 
much resemble, believed human dignity to be violated 
only when one person treats another solely as a means 
to attaining the first person's end, and not simultane-
ously as an end in himself. 
Niebuhr did not believe international politics to be 
inherently sinful, although he did believe that at times 
nations have to choose the lesser of evils. Though he 
saw through the moral pretensions by which nations 
seek to mask their interests, he tended to be more un-
derstanding of these pretensions than Morgenthau, 
maintaining that man has "so strong a sense of obliga-
tion to his fellows that he cannot pursue his own in-
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terests without pretending to serve his fellowman"-a 
fact which, in Niebuhr's judgment, belied the concept 
of total human depravity. 
Yet Niebuhr would have had reservations about 
Kennan's admonition to his countrymen to pursue 
ends unsullied by such things as arrogance, not be-
cause the advice is ignoble but because it is even more 
difficult for nations than for individuals to follow. 
That Kennan could expect Americans to follow such 
advice in pursuing their national interest, conducive to 
a better world, was due to his retention of aspects of 
the American self-interpretation which he had ex-
pressed in 194 7 in his famous, pseudonymous article, 
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In its analysis of the 
aims of Soviet foreign policy this article is a model of 
realism. It is reprinted as an appendix to American Dip-
lomacy, 1900-1950. 
When we look at the assumptions 
underlying the realists' works, we 
find that Hans Morgenthau had a 
more pessimistic view of human nature 
than even Reinhold Niebuhr had. 
In the article Kennan maintains that the Soviet chal-
lenge is a providential test of American virtue and that 
our meeting the challenge depends on our fulfilling 
our destiny to exercise moral and political leadership 
in the world. These assertions are a variation on two 
aspects of the American self-interpretation as 
examined by Niebuhr in The Irony of American History, 
which apeared in 1952, one year after Kennan pub-
lished his Walgreen lectures. According to Niebuhr, 
Americans believed, at the time he wrote, that a spe-
cial American Providence would reward or punish 
them according to the degree of their virtue, and that 
they were destined to lead the world, chiefly though 
not exclusively by example, in preserving and extend-
ing democracy. These beliefs are reflected not only in 
Kennan's article but also in the optimistic assessment 
of American potential in the body of his book. (In the 
light of his recent writings, one may question whether 
Kennan is currently as realistic in his appraisal of the 
Soviet Union as he was in 1947, and whether he still 
believes the parts of the American self-interpretation 
to which he once adhered.) 
It should be noted that the idea of American destiny 
as discussed by Niebuhr is not without illusions of the 
kind which beset utopianism, the legalistic-moralistic 
approach, and idealism; all these ways of thinking are 
mild variants of what Voegelin called gnosticism. Voe-
gelin, who died in 1985, was the first and greatest of 
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a group of emigre political thinkers which included 
Maritain, Simon, Strauss, and Morgenthau and which, 
along with Niebuhr and Kennan, sought to come to 
terms with the immense spiritual and political disorder 
of the twentieth century and with the threat to the 
West posed by Soviet Russia. 
The shadow of Hitler and Stalin hung over almost 
everything Voegelin wrote from the 1930s onward, in-
cluding his seemingly unrelated, four-volume magnum 
opus, Order and History. His most important ideas, like 
those of most of the other writers just mentioned, 
coalesced in highly compact form in his Walgreen lec-
tures. But because Voegelin, who was a moralist de-
spite himself, refused to engage in conventional 
moralizing and to indulge shrill denunciations of to-
talitarianism, preferring to analyze the spiritual states 
of the thinkers who set the stage for it, his own mor-
ality is sometimes questioned. 
In addition, he made people uncomfortable by say-
ing such things as that anyone who participates in 
gnostic ideologizing today, now that we know what it 
means, is an accomplice in the atrocities of Auschwitz 
and the Gulag Archipelago. Although such a state-
ment is undoubtedly too severe, it is hard to deny that 
all gnostic ideologists are brothers under the skin. On 
top of all this, Voegelin did not think that the West 
was yet entirely immune to the lure of totalitarianism, 
owing to the growing disorder of Western society and 
the continued appeal of gnostic ideologies. How many 
world wars and revolutions might be necessary before 
the present extravaganza is over, he professed not to 
know. 
Voegelin is sometimes thought to have been a dog-
matic theologian, but he disliked dogma because he 
believed that it failed to convey the religious experi-
ence that engendered it; and he deplored the religious 
strife that troubled France in the sixteenth century 
and laid waste Germany in the Thirty Years' War. One 
of the few modern thinkers whom he admired, Jean 
Bodin, sought through mysticism to transcend the re-
ligious turmoil of sixteenth-century France, just as 
Voegelin sought through the same means to transcend 
the ideological strife of his day. 
When asked his religious affiliation Voegelin would 
say that he was Lutheran, and some support exists in 
his earlier writing for this self-description. There is 
reason to believe, however, that as time went on he 
came to consider himself more and more a mystic and 
a philosopher in the sense of an exponent of 
Platonism and Aristotelianism and less and less a be-
liever in a religious creed and the revelation on which 
it is based. In this respect the following paragraph 
from his Anamnesis, published in 1966, is instructive 
(the translation is my own): 
20 
A neotic [Platonic-Artistotelian] interpretation does not 
arise independently of the conception of order of the 
society in which it appears; it arises rather in a critical 
encounter with that conception. Wherever noesis ap-
pears, it exists in a relationship of tension with the self-
understanding of society. To illustrate, I would point 
out only the tensions, all of great significance for the 
history of the world, between philosophy on the one 
hand and myth and sophistry on the other, between 
philosophy and theology, and today between philosophy 
and [gnostic] ideology. A confrontation of this kind 
serves as the point of departure for the differentiation 
in the course of which the noetic interpretation can be-
come a "science" which treats political reality as its "ob-
ject of study." The confrontation, moreover, works both 
ways, so that the representatives of the current nonnoe-
tic interpretations are not helpless against being treated 
as objects by their noetic critics. They do not let them-
selves be forced without resistance into the role of an 
"object of study," but rather view their noetic opponent 
as an object of study from within their own conception 
of order: from the standpoint of the cult of the polis 
the philosopher is seen as an atheist; from the 
standpoint of the theology of revelation he is seen as a 
heretic; from the standpoint of revolutionary ideology 
he is seen as a reactionary who represents a rival ideol-
ogy. 
V oegelin used gnostzctsm as a generic word for the 
belief, which can take many forms, that the anxiety of 
existence can be relieved and a state of bliss be 
achieved on earth by following a prescription, varying 
with the form, and calling, in effect, for the re-crea-
tion and moral perfection of man. V oegelin main-
tained that gnostic ideologies have existed in the West 
since the Renaissance, and that they arose against the 
background of Christian eschatology. In a well-known 
(if obscurely written) passage in The New Science of Poli-
tics, he said: "The problem of an eidos in history, 
hence, arises only when Christian transcendental ful-
fillment becomes immanentized. Such an immanentist 
hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a theoretical 
fallacy." What this passage means, simplified slightly 
and rendered in plain English, is that gnostics errone-
ously believe it possible to create heaven on earth. 
Gnosticism may occur in a religious or a secular con-
text. Liberation theology is gnostic, but so too is old-
fashioned, antireligious Marxism. Gnosticism may take 
an extreme form, as in Communism and National 
Socialism, or it may be mild, like the unrealistic 
ideologies of international politics which we have been 
examining. Utopianism and the legalistic-moralistic ap-
proach are gnostic in their faith in wars to end all wars 
and make the world safe for democracy, or in their 
belief that peace can be permanently secured through 
international law or international organization; 
idealism is gnostic in thinking that if certain unpleas-
ant facts are ignored they will go away. 
Thus the chief lesson to be learned from the realists 
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is their criticism of gnosticism in international politics. 
Also gnostic is the related idea, now virtually 
exhausted, that America is destined through example 
and action to help democratize the world. The idea is 
gnostic in overestimating America's ability to secure 
democracy at home by contributing to its preservation 
and extension abroad. 
One might ask whether Voegelin considered the de-
fenses of democracy by Maritain and Simon, as well as 
by Niebuhr in 1944 in The Children of Light and the 
Children of Darkness, to be gnostic ideologies, however 
mild. Voegelin certainly considered some persons on 
the public scene in the America of his day to be gnos-
tic "democratists." He did not comment on the works 
of Maritain, Simon, and Niebuhr, and what he would 
have said if asked is difficult to say. From the 
standpoint of revealed religion their works do not ap-
pear to have been gnostic. It is therefore not inevitable 
that the self-understanding of a democracy be gnostic. 
A last word should be said about the tendency, un-
fortunately furthered by certain passages in Niebuhr 
and Voegelin, to equate realism with Machiavellianism. 
It is true that in a sense Machiavelli shared with the 
realists, and especially with Morgenthau and Niebuhr, 
a lack of illusion about human nature. But one has 
only to compare the styles of the writers to see that, 
whereas Machiavelli was cool and dispassionate in the 
advice which he gave, the realists showed deep moral 
sensibilities in their criticism of utopianism, legalism-
moralism, and idealism as illusory and harmful. 
Moreover, the realists would never have concurred 
with Machiavelli's assertion that a desirable end jus-
tifies any means. Finally, it is arguable that, despite the 
view of human nature which he expressed, Machiavelli 
himself was a gnostic-indeed, that he was the first 
great gnostic political thinker of the modern era-in 
his belief that the "redemption" of Italy from foreign 
domination could be effected by rejecting the classical 
philosophers' goal of virtue and wisdom in govern-
ment for "new modes and orders" (these terms are his, 
the former occurring in the last chapter of The Prince 
and the latter at the beginning of the introduction to 
Book I of the Discourses). 
Even when American politicians are being realistic 
they are ordinarily not being Machiavellian; or, as Leo 
Strauss said, "At least to the extent that the American 
reality is inseparable from the American aspiration, 
one cannot understand Americanism without under-
standing Machiavellianism which is its opposite." 
Unrealistic thinking, in the forms which it took at 
midcentury and still takes today, is part of the crisis of 
the West, a crisis that is at bottom spiritual. In my 
view, Voegelin was too hard on dogmatic theology. 
Nonetheless, if his work helps to rekindle the spiritual 
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side of this civilization, or to provide a spiritual basis 
for one which succeeds it, his achievement will obvi-
ously have been epochal. Not only Voegelin, but also 
the other Walgreen lecturers and Niebuhr, made a 
contribution which, as to both substance and style, it 
would be extremely difficult to match today; and those 
who are concerned with the future of this country 
could do no better than to study their works. Cl 
Christmas Day 1779 
Now that the memorable day 
of Christ's birth shines, may sacred light be given 
To illuminate my heart and guide the way 
To gracious heaven. 
Christ, grant your trembling servant ease! 
May proper hope quiet my fearful reason! 
Grant sure belief and hear this prayer for peace. 
Dear Lord, in season. 
Hope 
Swift hours on swift hours flee; 
Day hastens past quick day! 
New light brings new hope: see 
Success on oath today. 
Thus, man's mocked. Random, cruel, 
Twilight deludes the fool. 
Wasting Time 
The hours for pleasure flee; wary 
Of time, mind blames ennui. 
The hours still flee. 
-The above prayers and meditations from the Latin 





Almost all holidays in America 
eventually become thanksgiving 
days, and our Day of National 
Thanksgiving, while delicious, now 
only repeats the thanksgiving 
theme given many other holidays. 
The popular punditry interpreting 
our holidays gradually claims them 
all as days to count our blessings 
and bless whatever has the good 
sense to bless us. I suppose subvert-
ing most of our holidays into days 
for counting our blessings should 
be no surprise in a wealthy, con-
servative country where the civil 
religion and popular culture cele-
brate a prosperous status quo, but 
I think I detect a sharper edge on 
our chronic holiday thanksgivings 
at Christmas. At this time Ameri-
cans also seem keen to celebrate 
rather convulsive conversions of 
the ungrateful into the generous, 
misanthropes into philanthropes. 
Probably nowhere is this Christ-
mas preoccupation with conver-
sions seen more clearly than in the 
seasonal TV screenings of the 
many film versions of Charles Dick-
ens' A Christmas Carol and especially 
Frank Capra's It's a Wonderful Life.* 
What these Christmas carols do so 
Richard Lee is Associate Professor of 
Humanities in Christ College at Valpa-
raiso University. 
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delightfully, of course, is subject 
their Bah-Humbugging heroes to a 
harrowing and hallowing super-
natural experience on Christmas 
Eve which converts them to the 
"Christmas spirit." These terroriz-
ing and tantalizing conversions may 
also help us make our own seasonal 
conversions into the American holi-
day spirit, namely counting our 
blessings and giving fresh, if now 
misty-eyed, thanksgiving for them. 
Dickens has the easier time of it 
in his Christmas Eve conversion of 
Ebenezer Scrooge, though he 
nonetheless pulls out all the stops 
in tormenting and tempting him 
into charity. "As I hope to live to 
be another man from what I was," 
Scrooge cries to the last Ghost, "I 
am prepared to bear you company 
with a thankful heart." In Victorian 
melodrama one need only change a 
crabbed and stingy master into a 
glad and generous master for the 
whole community to benefit, and 
Dickens' Fezziwiggian presumption 
in A Christmas Carol is that the 
happy master is the good master. 
While Scrooge is properly re-
pelled by the appalling revelations 
of the Ghosts, what he repents to-
ward is merriment. It turns out 
that what he needs to be good is 
festivity, in short, a warm, Dicken-
sian Christmas. The admonition of 
*Wonderful Life is now ripe with age 
(40 years old this year) and may 
seem nearly as distant from the pres-
ent generation as A Christmas Carol. 
This may also be the last year TV 
stations will screen Wonderful Life in 
its original black and white version, 
thus preserving its aura of the past 
and its aesthetic integrity, for it is 
among those unhappy film classics 
undergoing computerized tinting 
into color for contemporary TV au-
diences. My reactionary view is that 
we should no more change the col-
ors in a film than the adjectives in a 
novel, but I admit the cause is lost. 
Fellow reactionaries should put away 
black and white videocassettes of 
these film classics while there is still 
time. 
A Christmas Carol is: he keeps 
Christmas best who returns to the 
festivities of life to give thanks for 
them with his own gifts. 
The Capra carol takes on the 
harder task of converting suicidal 
George Bailey into seeing the gra-
ciousness of his life already heavily 
weighted with charity for others, 
and Capra thus achieves a deeper 
vision of the "Christmas spirit" 
than Dickens. When the angel Clar-
ence horrifies George with visions 
of the nightmare Bedford Falls 
would have become had he not 
lived there so dutifully, George 
gladly rushes home on Christmas 
Eve to take up his duties once 
again, perhaps now adding an un-
deserved jail sentence for misap-
propriation of funds at his Savings 
and Loan. 
But Capra is too wise, and possi-
bly too Christian, to leave us with 
the cold comfort that the world 
might be worse without us and we 
should keep on keeping on. 
Rather, he subjects George to a sec-
ond, more evangelical conversion 
in the arrival of all his neighbors to 
give him the money he needs to 
cover the lost (and stolen) Savings 
and Loan deposit. The dutiful do-
gooder George is thus delivered 
from his virtues and forced to see 
that he is not made good or glad 
by them but by the love of his 
friends. The message of Wonderful 
Life is: he keeps Christmas best 
who returns to the duties of life to 
give thanks for them-and discov-
ers the blessings of life which pre-
cede its duties. 
To discern the blessing which 
precedes any counting of our bless-
ings with any hearts readied to give 
thanks at all, we should, of course, 
need to turn to another, earlier 
story. But A Christmas Carol and, 
even better, Wonderful Life remain 
deservedly popular conversion 
stories for the American celebra-
tion of Christmas as another 
thanksgiving holiday. ~~ 
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Socratic Method & 
Music Performance 
Linda Ferguson 
For many of us who are devoted 
to the traditional ideals of liberal 
undergraduate education, the pre-
vailing pedagogical model is the 
Socratic method. Whether or not 
the historical Socrates actually 
taught by this method, and 
whether or not the Platonic 
dialogues actually proceed accord-
ing to it, the "Socratic method" 
generally implies an aggressive and 
adversarial meeting of teacher and 
student in which the student for-
mulates a position on a question 
raised by the teacher, and the 
teacher challenges that position by 
finding its weaknesses; once the 
weaknesses are systematically re-
vealed, the student remedies them 
and presents a re-formulation for 
further testing. 
When the student's formulation 
is sufficient to withstand the criti-
cism of the teacher, that formula-
tion is used in constructing a new 
and more advanced formulation 
about a more complex issue which 
the teacher will introduce by ques-
Linda Ferguson writes regularly on 
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University's Freshman Seminar Pro-
gram. 
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tioning when the student has dem-
onstrated mastery of the simpler 
one. This method is distinct from 
the lecture and also from the dis-
cussion; sometimes it is called 
"tutorial." (I resist here, although I 
recognize, a cynical impulse to de-
fine "Socratic teaching" as a way of 
tricking my student into thinking as 
I do, or of forcing him, through 
word games, to say that he does.) 
It has occasionally occurred to 
me, as I travel between the lecture 
classroom and the private music 
studio, that if "Socratic-style 
dialogue" is to go on in teaching 
these days, it might have a better 
chance in the studio than in the 
classroom. In a recent volume on 
higher learning (Schooling and the 
Acquisition of Knowledge), Richard C. 
Anderson of the University of Il-
linois describes Socratic teaching as 
the task of "[keeping] the student 
working until he or she has con-
structed a framework that will 
stand to criticism." At present this 
matches the task of the practical 
music teacher more exactly than it 
describes the usual work of the 
classroom lecturer. 
Practical music-making (i.e. , per-
formance) is not usually viewed as 
a "liberal study" but as a "servile" 
technical and specialized pursuit, 
perpetuated through a series of 
contacts between student and 
teacher during which the student 
learns to imitate the sounds the 
teacher makes or to produce the 
sounds the teacher describes. The 
goal, usually vocational, is that the 
student will master the sound-mak-
ing operations in order to enact 
them in public for others. (Insofar 
as many "liberal arts" courses have 
parallel practical goals, they are 
also "servile," technical, and special-
ized.) 
A performance of music is not 
an argument in the discursive 
sense, but it is the taking of a po-
sition. An excellent performance is 
the utterance of a fully framed and 
persuasive formulation about the 
piece. The goal of the teaching is, 
to recall Anderson, "to keep the 
student working until he or she has 
constructed a framework that will 
stand to criticism"; in musical study 
that translates "to prepare a per-
formance worthy of an audience." 
Although the content and pur-
pose of practical music study differ 
from the "liberal arts," the condi-
tions which seem most likely to pre-
vent "Socratic" teaching in the 
classroom do not impede the pri-
vate music lesson. In the studio, the 
one-to-one teacher-student ratio, 
otherwise found only in the most 
advanced and specialized reading 
and research courses, is the norm. 
The music student makes a sus-
tained utterance (i .e., a recitation) 
and is then criticized systematically. 
In the music lesson criticism takes 
place in private; since the student 
knows at the outset that criticism of 
the performance will ensue, it is 
not unusual and shocking, al-
though it may still be painful. Obvi-
ously the student must actively pre-
pare, else the lesson will have no 
text. 
The path of the lesson necessar-
ily follows from what the student 
has first posited in performance. 
Quoting again from Anderson, "in 
Socratic instruction it is the student 
who forges the conceptual system. 
The teacher is guided by an under-
standing of the accepted system 
and continuously updated diag-
noses of the current status of the 
student's schema, but the teacher 
does not 'lay on' the accepted 
theory." Occasionally Imitation 
("the laying on of accepted theory") 
is the most efficient and effective 
way to clarify a point in a lesson, to 
move the instruction ahead to a 
more interesting and complicated 
question, just as occasionally lectur-
ing is more efficient and effective 
than questioning in a classroom. 
But excellent teaching both in mu-
sical techniques and in interpreta-
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tion of scores involves more than 
simple imitation, the studio's ver-
sion of "regurgitation" of informa-
tion. 
Again, I do not claim that per-
formance studies are generically 
the same as liberal academic 
studies, or that they are better. 
Rather, I suggest that in looking 
for ways to enliven classroom 
teaching, perhaps we could trans-
port something of the dynamic and 
rigor of the private music lesson to 
the lecture room or seminar. This 
possibility first occurred to me last 
summer, when Valparaiso Univer-
sity was host to two distinguished 
guests. They came here under en-
tirely differing circumstances and 
to fulfill widely diverse missions. 
One of the visitors was Marshall 
Gregory of Butler University who 
addressed a group of V. U. faculty 
during a three-day workshop, 
"Critical Thinking Across the Cur-
riculum"; the other was John 
Wustman, internationally acclaimed 
pianist and vocal coach, who had 
accepted the University's invitation 
to locate his two-week masterclass 
for singers and pianists on our 
campus. 
Gregory's lecture defined the ob-
ligation of teaching as cultivation of 
the abilities to accept and respond 
productively to criticism. He urged 
that we examine students for their 
ability to analyze, not to memorize; 
that we abandon the lecture, which 
promotes passivity; and that we 
also abandon the "discussion" 
method in which the teacher's goal 
is merely to encourage participa-
tion, in favor of a pedagogy of crit-
ical dialogue: active formulation of 
continuous reasoning by students, 
subjected to constant criticism by 
teachers. 
Gregory acknowledged the dif-
ficulties of this pedagogical model, 
especially in light of circumstances 
imposed beyond the teacher's im-
mediate control: large class size, re-
calcitrant students, demand for 
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"objective" testing and grading, ex-
pectation that large amounts of 
subject matter will be mastered in 
the course, and pressure to divert 
large amounts of the teacher's time 
and energy to work other than 
teaching. 
In looking for ways to 
enliven teaching, perhaps 
we could transport 
something of the dynamic 
and rigor of the private 
music lesson to the 
lecture room or seminar. 
Gregory's address was not espe-
cially well-received. In theory, the 
method he advocated is hard to 
fault, but it is even harder to prac-
tice. And the line of argument 
seemed weakened by the fact that 
he lectured for an hour on why lec-
turing is not an effective form of 
teaching. But Gregory's aim had 
not been to demonstrate good 
teaching; rather he had come to 
challenge us to think about what 
good teaching should look like. 
John Wustman, who had more 
time to make his case, did not 
spend a single of the sixty class-
room hours in lecture, nor did he 
ever speak about teaching. He pro-
vided a sustained demonstration of 
what good teaching looks like. 
Wustman does not claim to teach 
by "a method." Yet frequently I 
was reminded of Gregory's 
rhetoric, and the method he had 
advocated, as when Wustman 
would admonish a student to con-
sult the text, or to reject simple 
"canned" answers. "Look at the 
score," he would urge. "I am test-
ing your thought, not your mem-
ory!" 
In response to a question about 
the construction of a song, a stu-
dent replies in a standard academic 
code: "ABA" (meaning, "in three 
sections, the first and third being 
identical"). "ABA! What is that? 
You remind me of school!" 
Wustman exclaims scornfully, 
though it is clearly useful to under-
stand the ternary form as long as 
that understanding is the means to 
further thought rather than the 
limit of it. Although Wustman 
prides himself on not "being 
academic," it is obvious that what 
he means by "academic" is what 
Jacques Barzun calls "Hokum" ("ar-
tificial apples of knowledge"). 
"Masterclass," a classroom form 
of studio music lesson, signifies dif-
ferently to different "masters." 
Sometimes the masterclass is an op-
portunity for an aspiring young 
performer to be discovered by a fa-
mous performer. The Pavarotti 
masterclasses held several years ago 
at the Julliard School (which were 
accompanied by Mr. Wustman) 
might be so described; the students 
who appeared were carefully 
screened, and the "classes" con-
sisted of their polished perform-
ances, on national television. 
The Wustman classes, although 
conducted by a famous profes-
sional, are not of the showcase va-
riety. No competition is held to 
select the participants. The class is 
advertised nationally and perform-
ers with sufficient time, money, 
and confidence apply. Applicants 
are accepted on a first-come, first-
serve basis. Wustman limits the 
number of participants to forty or 
fifty to insure adequate attention to 
each one, but he does not specify 
any other requirements, and he ac-
cepts an unlimited number of au-
ditors. 
Simply, he takes each student's 
"recitation," or performance, and 
leads the student through the proc-
ess of testing for weaknesses and of 
reformulation. The method is the 
same regardless of the level of ex-
pertise demonstrated. The classes 
attract professionals, students, and 
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amateurs from across the country. 
Last summer the youngest partici-
pant was an 18-year-old college stu-
dent from Canada; the oldest was a 
retired teacher of singing from 
Mississippi. Two were physicians; 
one was a receptionist for a truck-
ing company. Many were aspiring 
young professional singers and 
pianists, seeking to test and im-
prove their performances (and 
thereby, their chances for success 
in their field); others were teachers 
of music, seeking to do the same. 
The classroom routine is estab-
lished early. Each of the lessons-as 
many as fifteen each day-follows 
the same format. In the presence 
of all members of the class, most of 
whom are equipped with scores, 
pencils, and tape recorders, a pair 
of performers (singer and accom-
panist) present their hypothesis 
about the song they have selected; 
that is, they perform it. Wustman's 
first response (nearly always some 
version of "Well, it is going to be 
very good!") is more often a prom-
ise than a compliment. 
If the song has been sung in a 
language other than English, the 
singer then presents a translation, 
prepared ahead of time. Published 
translations, often provided in the 
scores, may not be consulted, in 
part because the teacher believes 
them to be unreliable, and in part 
because he requires that the stu-
dent take full responsibility for par-
tiCipation in the piece. (Marshall 
Gregory would describe this as 
"earning ownership of the ideas 
raised by the text.") 
Some interpretative comments 
pertaining to the literary content of 
the song may follow, or perhaps a 
piece or two of historical informa-
tion may be dispensed in passing. 
The performance is begun again. 
After the first phrase, the testing of 
the "hypothesis" commences. 
Causes, rather than effects, are 
treated. "Legato," therefore, does 
not mean "smooth," but rather it 
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means "bound, tied together, con-
nected." "What is bound together?" 
"Notes." "What binds the notes?" 
"Sound." "What do you need to do 
to make the sounds more con-
nected?" And the line of question-
ing continues until the Wustman 
catechism on "legato" has been dis-
covered and articulated by the stu-
dent. 
Students who have attended the 
classes before have the advantage 
of having heard and practiced 
some of the answers, and some-
times there is the sense that true 
dialectic has given way to riddles 
and trick questions. But some of 
the questions that sound like rid-
dles (such as "what is an eighth 
note?") have a purpose which af-
fects the way a passage is per-
formed. (In the case of the eighth 
note, Wustman argues that "two of 
something is more than half of 
something" and that an eighth note 
must be thought of as the time of 
two sixteenth notes, not as one-half 
the time of a quarter note; his 
Amen 
point has to do with the need to 
focus on continuing the sound 
rather than on stopping it.) 
When a student struggles to re-
spond, but fails to connect with the 
line of questioning, Wustman will 
change directions. "Of the three or 
four things I can think of to say 
about that note, which one of them 
do you want me to say?" asks an 
exasperated young man. "That it is 
the point at which the phrase turns 
around," Wustman replies simply, 
and lets both teacher and student 
off the hook to get on with a more 
interesting point. 
Sometimes he allows awkward si-
lences to intrude into the dialogue. 
Either by accident or design these 
silences demonstrate the need for 
sounds to be "bound together," and 
serve to illustrate what happens to 
a line of singing that is not legato. 
Other times, a question from the 
floor may result in a brief, but or-
derly exposition on a point of gen-
eral applicability (as in a spontane-
ous mini-lecture on the pronuncia-
With tenative probes and advances-like snow 
that first feathers orchards, then stars on the window, 
before it can thicken to one seamless curtain 
connecting by dawn earth with heaven -
it comes. 
Room by luminous room, building anthems from 
brush of its hem against walls you've been watching 
since waiting began. 
Close now. So close, its Amen 
fills space you'd reserved for, undressing, for letting 
at last it take charge. And while snow outside lengthens, 
it bends to assist, to lift you, well-robed now. 
through storm's unrelenting hosannas. 
Lois Reiner 
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tion of the final "ch" sound in the 
singing of German.) 
One rule of the Wustman mas-
terclass is that once a lesson has 
been given on a particular song, no 
other students may perform that 
song in class. Besides assuring that 
varied repertoire will be covered, 
this policy encourages rapt atten-
tion to the treatment of "standard 
repertoire" pieces presented in 
class. The same lesson need not be 
given to each student individually if 
all students in the room are atten-
tive to the one who is performing. 
Having observed Wustman at 
work both in the masterclass and in 
the private lesson, I know that in 
the private lesson he moves more 
quickly, more by telling than by 
asking, more by imitation than by 
dialogue. There is a reason for this. 
Two weeks of private lessons pro-
vide at most two hours of instruc-
tion; two weeks of Wustman mas-
terclasses provide sixty hours, if the 
observing students can sustain their 
involvement in the line of question-
ing and in the subsequent "refor-
mulations." One of the miracles of 
the Wustman classes seems to be 
that for the most part, they can. 
Earlier, I speculated that the pri-
vate music lesson may provide the 
rare opportunity for true "tutorial" 
teaching. Yet Wustman's success in 
these classes seems to rely in part 
on the presence of an "active" audi-
ence. The dynamic process between 
student and teacher seems to 
flourish in the more exciting con-
text of "performance." Perhaps this 
is because it is a performance art 
that is being taught; perhaps it is 
because Wustman is, besides being 
a master teacher, a master enter-
tainer; and perhaps it is because 
the Socratic model of questioning 
an individual in a classroom setting 
is a good one after all. 
The Wustman Masterclasses have 
in recent years become something 
of a legend among American sing-
ers and accompanists who specialize 
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in vocal repertoire. Wustman holds 
a professorship at the University of 
Illinois, but is better known inter-
nationally for his recordings and 
concertizing, especially as accom-
panist to tenor Luciano Pavarotti. 
For two weeks each summer, he 
"retires" from his other commit-
ments to teach in a fashion not 
practical in the usual workaday 
life of teacher and student. For a 
number of years, the classes were 
held on the campus of Eureka 
College in central Illinois. Desir-
ing a change of setting, Wustman 
was attracted to the Valparaiso 
campus, a "retreat-like" atmo-
sphere with few distractions 
which is also relatively conve-
nient for those who would travel 
here: off the beaten path, but 
not too far. 
If all goes as expected, the 
Wustman Masterclasses will return 
to the Valparaiso campus next 
June. They will provide once again 
on our campus a highly successful 
model of teaching. I can assert that 
the model is successful because the 
evidence can be heard. The feed-
back is immediate and available to 
everyone present. Through a proc-
ess of critical testing of ideas about 
singing and playing a particular 
song, we hear increasingly convinc-
ing "reformulations." 
Last year, when Marshall Greg-
ory challenged the faculty to un-
dertake radical and united reform 
of our pedagogical methods, his ar-
gument sounded like a song I had 
heard too many times before. In 
Wustman's practical application of 
Gregory's theory, it showed some 
new promise. Gregory warns that if 
we are unwilling to reform our 
teaching, we must make peace with 
the alternative: to do the best we 
can, given the intellectual passivity 
of our students. John Wustman's 
teaching does not settle for that al-
ternative. His presence on this cam-
pus should inspire us not to settle 
for it either. Cl 
Hard Choices 
Albert R. Trost 
Nuclear weapons issues are not 
very prominent on our campus. 
This is not for want of effort by 
some of our faculty. I think it is 
fair to say that among the faculty 
there are several who might be 
characterized as anti-nuclear ac-
tivists. Colleagues in such diverse 
departments as English, Philoso-
phy, and Theology have offered 
courses on nuclear weapons and 
war topics. 
Some of the same faculty and a 
few students sponsored a visit two 
years ago by the Australian anti-nu-
clear activist, Dr. Helen Caldicott. 
That event drew about six hundred 
people, a very large number for a 
public event on our campus. Her 
emotional commitment to the cause 
of a nuclear freeze, followed by dis-
armament, was contagious, and she 
carried the crowd along, for the 
most part. Yet eighteen months 
later there is little evidence that she 
was ever on the campus. There is 
no more debate on the question 
than there was before she arrived, 
and there is certainly no anti-nu-
clear movement. 
This semester I had my "go" at 
Albert R. Trost, who writes regularly 
for The Cresset on public affairs, is 
Chairman of the Department of Politi-
cal Science at Valparaiso University. 
The Cresset 
the subject, believing in a spirit of 
true professional chauvinism that 
political scientists had formulated 
the most reasoned debate about the 
nuclear question and therefore that 
ours was the proper discipline to 
consider the issue. I have devoted 
at least one-third of the current 
semester in an International Rela-
tions course to a consideration of 
nuclear weapons, deterrence, and 
nuclear war. One of three required 
texts is also devoted to the subject. 
When one of the best students in 
the class and one of the most so-
cially committed came forward to 
tell me after four weeks that this 
was too much, I realized that I too 
had failed to ignite a consuming 
fire of interest in the topic. I had 
failed to shock or stimulate my stu-
dents. After several weeks they 
were saturated and did not want to 
pursue the topic further. 
Valparaiso University is typical of 
most American campuses on this 
issue as well as being fairly typical 
of American public opinion in gen-
eral. The vast maJority of people 
are agreed that nuclear war is hor-
rible and must be avoided. They 
are willing to say this to a public 
opinion pollster, or possibly on a 
referendum proposition to create a 
nuclear-free zone on their campus 
or in their city. 
Beyond this few are willing to go, 
either in study and debate or in 
political commitment. The nuclear 
freeze movement has never caught 
on in our country as it has in Eu-
rope. In the United States, protests 
on nuclear policy tend to be well-
organized, but small. The debate 
and the political activity are almost 
entirely an elite phenomenon, en-
gaged in by some professors, med-
ical doctors, and researchers, and 
especially by many clergy from the 
mainline religious bodies. In fact, if 
there is a clear opposition to na-
tional policy on nuclear weapons it 
comes not from the Democratic 
Party, but from within some of the 
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mainline churches. 
Because public opinion on nu-
clear issues is so uninformed and 
uninterested, it is easily manipu-
lated. President Reagan was able 
within a few days after Reykjavik to 
turn what had been vague senti-
ment for an arms control agree-
ment and disappointment at it not 
being achieved at the summit into a 
ringing endorsement of his 
Strategic Defense Initiative. He 
managed to accomplish this by 
framing SDI in simple terms, as re-
liable protection against a nuclear 
attack. Who could be against this? 
Few cared to pursue the relation of 
SDI to other aspects of the arms 
control agenda, to our current 
strategy of deterrence, or to pros-
pects for an arms race. 
If there is a clear 
opposition to national 
policy on nuclear weapons 
it comes not from the 
Democratic Party, but 
from within some of the 
mainline churches. 
Imminence is one key to arous-
ing a public on nuclear weapons is-
sues. European publics are more 
easily aroused than ours because 
the possibility of nuclear war in-
their countries seems more of an 
immediate threat. New missiles are 
going in on their soil. Furthermore, 
in most of the scenarios for nuclear 
war, the weapons will be flying 
over and detonating in their air 
space. The one tangible border be-
tween East and West is in Europe, 
most particularly in Germany. The 
students in a classroom in Valpa-
raiso, or anywhere else in North 
America, cannot visualize nuclear 
possibilities with the same immedi-
acy. In fact, the discussion of nu-
clear war in our country seems un-
real and hypothetical. 
Simplicity is also essential for the 
arousal of interest in this topic. If 
one makes the avoidance of nuclear 
war the only goal of our national 
security policy, and if one begins 
the discussion with pictures of the 
devastation at Hiroshima in 1945, 
or sees the recent films Threads and 
The Day After, or maybe something 
popular like War Games, and ends 
up listening to Carl Sagan describe 
a "nuclear winter," it is a direct and 
easy route to the position that nu-
clear weapons are "obscene." And 
if they are obscene, then they must 
be disposed of, even if this means 
acting unilaterally. 
To simplify the choice to 
Hiroshima in 1945 or Valparaiso in 
1986 is to offer death or life. One 
does not have to be led to make 
this choice. For some people, even 
intellectuals and professionals, the 
choice may genuinely be this sim-
ple, and therefore no choice at all. 
It is not likely to be the position of 
people with governmental authori-
ty, especially those with positions in 
the governments of the five nuclear 
powers. 
Almost everyone can agree that 
nuclear war should be avoided, and 
almost everyone will agree that that 
should be a high priority of our 
foreign and defense policy. How-
ever, there are other high-priority 
objectives that cannot be lost sight 
of. The defense of the borders of 
the United States against both a 
nuclear attack and a conventional 
invasion is an obligation every ad-
mimstration must attend to. Since 
the NATO Treaty in 1949, our 
government has also included the 
defense of Western Europe and 
Canada as a high-order objective, 
although it must be admitted that 
there are significant numbers of 
Europeans who no longer see an 
American role so clearly. The Rus-
sians probably follow the mirror set 
of these priorities, though they may 
weight them differently. 
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The difficult and complicated 
problem for us and the Russians is 
to provide for defense while at the 
same time avoiding nuclear war, 
given the fact that both sides have 
large inventories of nuclear 
weapons and see one another as 
the major rival in international 
politics. What the national leader-
ship of the major powers face is a 
choice of several strategies or 
policies, none of which completely 
insures that they will be able to 
realize all of their priorities. Their 
choices are not as simple as life vs. 
death. They have an obligation to 
work out the varied and complex 
implications of their choices as 
carefully as they can. 
There is certainly no lack of liter-
ature on nuclear weapons questions 
to help policy makers and some of 
the rest of us understand the di-
lemmas and the choices available. 
This literature requires time and 
effort to master, and it may not re-
sult in unambiguous answers. The 
areas of nuclear weapons, strategy, 
war, and arms control have been 
among the most fully and systemat-
ically argued in a variety of disci-
plines. This is clearly true of the 
political science contribution. If 
ethical questions are more the prov-
ince of theology and philosophy, 
and weapons and their physical 
effects the province of the sciences 
and engineering, the strategic 
discussion has been mainly carried 
on in political science, more 
specifically international relations. 
I have found that for even a 
basic lay understanding of strategic 
and policy questions in this area at 
least three weeks of class time and 
about twenty hours of reading are 
required. One must first of all 
master the technical jargon, at least 
to the point of understanding the 
two dozen or so basic concepts. 
Careful reading of some essential 
theoretical literature is also 
necessary. In addition, one has to 
know the history of American-
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Soviet relations, the historical 
development of nuclear strategy in 
both the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the state of the 
respective nuclear arsenals, and the 
national security policy-making 
process and the policy that results 
from it. 
There are many who are 
active in the various 
nuclear policy movements 
who have not taken the 
time to become familiar 
with the strategic 
dimensions of the issue. 
Even this basic understanding is 
not very widespread in the popula-
tion, though one hopes it reaches 
the top policy-making levels. There 
are many who are active in the 
various nuclear policy movements 
who have not taken the time to be-
come familiar with the strategic di-
mensions of the issue. They may 
sense that the clarity and simplicity 
with which they view the issues may 
be compromised by a jaunt 
through this literature. For in-
stance, it provides almost no sup-
port for the positions of either un-
ilateral nuclear disarmament or nu-
clear superiority. Even nuclear 
freeze does not find much support 
in the literature. The distances be-
tween real options narrow and 
blur. 
The choices become more com-
plex and ambiguous in the area of 
strategy because the avoidance of 
nuclear war is only one priority for 
policy-makers. Defense of the na-
tion is another, as is defense of al-
lies. In addition, all the national 
security priorities must be consid-
ered, at least on the American 
side, in terms of what is politically 
possible given our pluralistic and 
democratic system of decision-mak-
ing. 
The strategic option that both 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union have chosen since the early 
1950s is that of nuclear deterrence. 
This option has allowed them to 
realize all of their major priorities 
for thirty years. They have avoided 
nuclear war and successfully pre-
vented encroachment on their re-
spective territories and that of their 
formal allies. The strategy of de-
terrence paradoxically threatens 
nuclear retaliation against a nuclear 
attacker. The object is to avoid ever 
having to use nuclear weapons by 
threatening to use them. It is easy 
to see that for those who see nu-
clear weapons as obscene, this strat-
egy is unpalatable. Our strategy of 
deterrence, it should be noted, 
threatens retaliation not only 
against a · nuclear attacker but also 
against a massive conventional at-
tack on our allies in Europe. 
According to the prevailing strat-
egy of deterrence, the threatened 
retaliation must be both credible 
and stable to be effective. Credibil-
ity means simply that whatever 
threat is proposed, it must be be-
lieved by the adversary. The credi-
bility of a deterrent, for example, is 
increased if it is invulnerable to a 
pre-emptive strike by an adversary. 
An enemy must believe that you 
have the will to use your retaliatory 
weapon. It cannot be so big and 
horrible that it threatens the de-
struction of oneself as well as the 
other side. 
Stability is a more elusive re-
quirement. Roughly it means pre-
serving a balance of threats be-
tween potential adversaries. It im-
plies that whatever is threatened as 
a retaliation must not be so 
threatening that the rival sees an 
advantage in a pre-emptive strike 
before your threatening weapons 
can be used. Stability is maintained 
if the adversary does not engage in 
an arms race to try to counter the 
threat of the retaliation. 
To make matters even more dif-
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ficult, stability and credibility are 
frequently incompatible objectives. 
They must be traded off against 
one another, making for a less than 
perfect deterrent. For instance, a 
small nuclear weapon like the neu-
tron bomb is very credible because 
it is easy to believe it will be used 
since it would not compromise the 
safety of the user. On the other 
hand, it is very unstable. It is so 
small that the United States might 
be tempted to use it in a conven-
tional war as a defensive weapon 
rather than holding it back as a de-
terrent. It would cross the nuclear 
threshold and make escalation 
easier for both sides. To take 
another example, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles are credi-
ble because submarines are easily 
concealed and hence invulnerable. 
However, they are so threatening 
that the adversary is encouraged to 
discover the technology to locate 
the submarines, prompting a re-
newed arms race. 
The Strategic Defense Initiative 
must also be seen and evaluated in 
light of the requirements of a strat-
egy of deterrence. It is not the ob-
vious choice, from the standpoint 
of deterrence, that President 
Reagan has presented. In the at-
mosphere of the talks in Iceland, 
he made it seem as if SDI would 
preclude the need for offensive nu-
clear weapons and therefore elimi-
nate the threat of nuclear attack. 
At the end of its development, SDI 
would be effective against any of-
fensive nuclear weapon. Only a 
fool, it would seem, would not be 
attracted to this prospect. 
However, the road through re-
search and development of SDI is 
laden with lack of credibility and 
stability. Right now, the technology 
required is hardly credible. All as-
pects of the system seem highly 
vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, 
even when the system is completed. 
To the extent that it might work, 
there is every incentive for the 
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Soviet Union to strike before it is in 
place. And this is not the only 
threat to stability. The Soviet 
Union will be encouraged to re-
search counters to the system, pro-
voking a massive and expensive 
arms race. 
Though SDI's trillion dollar price 
tag should provoke more debate 
about alternatives and strategic 
considerations, the opposite ap-
pears to be happening after the 
Iceland summit. The attraction of 
the simple solution offered by the 
President was too much of a temp-
tation for many in Congress, as 
well as for a large majority of the 
public. The President's promise of 
total security from a nuclear attack, 
however shaky its premises, seemed 
preferable to the threat and am-
biguities present strategies present. 
The swamp of ambiguity to 
which one succumbs by reading the 
literature of strategic theory cannot 
be better illustrated than by the po-
sition on nuclear arms adopted by 
the American Catholic bishops in 
1983. As one might expect from 
spokespersons of the mainline 
Christian churches, they exercised 
their "preference for life" by ex-
plicitly saying that the use of nu-
clear weapons cannot be justified. 
However, in preparing their state-
ment they and their staffs had 
gone through the strategic litera-
ture with some thoroughness, so 
they felt obligated to recognize the 
need for a deterrent nuclear force. 
Yet, according to their statement, 
this would be a deterrent force 
whose actual use in a retaliatory 
strike could never be justified. Such 
a deterrent, of course, would be 
the ultimate in non-credibility. 
A more consistent statement on 
the bishop's part would have omit-
ted any reference to the need for a 
deterrent. To do so, however, 
would have been to ignore the na-
tion's need for national security 
and thus not to be intellectually re-
sponsive to the strategic literature 
(and the strategic realities). 
The way to progress on nuclear 
arms policy is not clear. Anxiety 
over the possible use of nuclear 
weapons is high, but any govern-
ment has a duty to defend the na-
tion as well as to avoid nuclear war, 
and nuclear weapons are now a 
given in that defense. The path of 
wisdom in the nuclear age is not to 
wish the weapons away but to at-
tend carefully to the thinking that 
has gone on for thirty years on 
how to avoid their use. Cl 
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Review Essay 
A Grave Grace 
Warren Rubel 
Gravity and Grace: 
Reflections and 
Provocations 
By Joseph Sittler. Minneapolis: 
Augsburg. 127 pp. $6.95. 
This slight but weighty book can 
be tasted, swallowed, and, to alter 
slightly Francis Bacon's maxim, 
chewed and digested like a 
nourishing bagel. Or to put the 
perspective another way, if books 
are "speculative instruments," then 
Joseph Sittler's Gravity and Grace of-
fers the reader at least a double de-
light: we get the long telescopic 
view of the sage and we get the 
microscopic view of the occasionally 
irate senex or old man. 
As Martin E. Marty points out in 
his helpful foreword, the book can 
be read through from beginning to 
end because a number of sustain-
ing themes give it its own coher-
ence and direction. Yet we can 
read and reread isolated para-
graphs because Sittler discrimi-
Warren Rubel is Professor of 
Humanities in Christ College at Valpa-
raiSo University. 
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nately loves the world, he cares for 
language, and he works for the 
precise word. He does these things 
well because he has a center and he 
works out from that center. 
In the collaboration that led to 
the book's publication, editor 
Linda-Marie DeHoff has arranged 
the various sustaining themes in 
what I took to be a kind of ascend-
ing and descending curve: we 
begin with nature and grace in a 
world, Sittler reminds us, that has 
been around much longer than we 
have, a world much larger than we 
believed it to be just a generation 
ago. We move into that world with 
the fresh trust and risk of faith. We 
proceed to the grainier problems 
that shaped Sittler's own sense of 
vocation in life-ministry, theology, 
education, and language, to men-
tion a few. We then curve down-
ward to modern culture, to moral 
discourse in a nuclear age, and, fi-
nally, to aging itself, to "a summing 
up and a letting go." 
The integrating element in these 
themes is the kind of selfhood that 
gradually comes clear to the 
reader. Grace and gravity penetrate 
and interpenetrate in Sittler's vision 
of the self both being found and 
finding: self to the world, self to 
others-a connectedness affirmed 
in Christian theology, brought to 
realization in our understanding of 
what it means to be a human being, 
"the essence or core of likeness that 
permits language and intelligibility, 
even if we have no language in 
common," because what we are and 
what we may become are founded 
and funded by Grace. 
This sense of inner connected-
ness leads Sittler to some powerful 
claims about the ingredients and 
exigencies of Christian life and tes-
timony in the contemporary world. 
Strongly opposed to static appeals 
to authority about the Word of 
God, Sittler writes: 
The authority of scriptural words 
and passages is internal, not exter-
nal, and it is not automatic. The 
authority of scripture has to de-
pend on the text's internal con-
gruity with the human pathos: the 
reality of what it means to be a 
human being in this appalling 
time. The pathos, confusion, am-
biguity, and scatteredness of life-
this is the situation to which we 
must address the biblical Word. 
And that Word will be invested 
with authority by virtue of its 
Liberating, enlightening, and prom-
ising congruity, not by virtue of 
"the Bible says." For most people, 
what "the Bible says" is no more 
authoritative than what the New 
York Times or the Washington Post 
says. The authority must be uncov-
ered as intrinsic. 
I quote the paragraph in full be-
cause it discloses the kind of con-
structive theology the author works 
from and toward and because the 
paragraph gives us a basic orienta-
tion or grounding in the range of 
Sittler's concerns as speaker and 
writer. Because the Word of God 
has possessed him and because he 
continues to seek to possess that 
Word in his own evolving selfhood, 
he connects as human being 
"soaked in scripture" with both the 
seemingly trivial-attending a New 
York Yankee baseball game with 
Franklin Clark Fry, who puns on a 
Luis Aparicio error-and the cru-
cial issues of our day-from ecol-
ogy to the compelling interrelated-
ness of Christian love with justice. 
We find a second kind of delight 
in attending to this work. "Green 
grapes gripe, and young men are 
not ripe," goes an old Russian 
proverb. Neither green in his age 
nor a griper, Sittler combines "re-
flections with provocations," as the 
subtitle of the book suggests. There 
is a wise, even crotchety testiness to 
his provocations. 
Sensitive to the gaps between 
what we are and what we should 
be, Sittler sends out those verbal 
barbs that sting us into conscious-
ness about the disturbing incon-
gruities in our culture and in our-
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selves. But because he himself rec-
ognizes that our "interior life goes 
round and round and round, with 
deepening ambiguities," we do not 
feel that Sittler stands outside of 
our human predicament. Thus, he 
can speak of both the mind's need 
for order and the comic extremities 
of the aunt who saved boxes to 
contain all things that women can 
save: she even had a box labeled 
"pieces of string too short to save." 
And even if he turns on the com-
placent within our common estab-
lishments, one listens carefully be-
cause Sittler has developed a kind 
of impersonal self-transcendence 
which redeems the very predica-
ment he isolates and chastises. 
There is, consequently, a kind of 
poignancy in his watching with awe 
the first man landing on the moon 
while his teenage son never drops 
his feet from the table and quips to 
his father, "Don't worry, Pop, 
they'll make it." 
Or he can turn on academia: 
"college faculty should be educated 
persons. This is often not the case. 
Many are trained-not educated. 
You can train dogs to jump, and 
you can train people to report what 
is going on in chemistry and trans-
mit that information. But education 
means training the mind to unfold 
the multiple facets of human exist-
ence with some appreciation, eager-
ness, and joy. It is, in essence, the 
opposite of being dull. We've got 
plenty of trained, dull people on 
our own faculties, but not many 
educated people." 
Or Sittler can turn on the con-
temporary church and congrega-
tion: "Much of the intellectual and 
aesthetic life within the contempo-
rary congregation is simply con-
temptible. The intellectual content 
of the ordinary sermon is con-
temptible. It is often full of moral 
fervor and piety, but it is usually 
absent in the clarity of ideas that 
thread against the accepted norms 
and offer new possibilities for re-
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flection." 
I touch on these separate judg-
ments both because they may strike 
home and because the context of 
these quotes-a teenage son more 
at home in a technological culture 
than his father, an indictment 
against academic dullness after a 
portrayal of a college teacher of lit-
erature who excited football play-
ers, a contemporary Christian 
church placed against the vigorous 
intellectual and artistic life of the 
early church-suggests how inclu-
sive Sittler's perspective can be. He 
cauterizes to heal. 
The final delight in reading this 
little book nests in a special 
paradox. Although Sittler is at his 
best when he argues against the 
turn toward subjectivity of our age, 
when he places before us the "time-
less, high impersonality" of the 
church as an ancient and lively 
worshipping community held to-
gether by God's initiative for us 
and toward us in Jesus Christ, he is 
the kind of person one points to as 
a human being both full of faith 
and faithful. 
No easy mortality and no easy 
immortality here. Rather a pilgrim 
in whom mind and spirit meet, 
who sees in nature the love of God, 
in history the grace of God, in his 
own life the mystery of the love 
and grace of God at work. His life 
may be curving downward to 
death. He has learned about letting 
go, one gathers, because he knows 
how preciously one seeks to grasp 
the fullness of life in the flickering 
and flaming light of human con-
SCiousness. 
I first read selected Sittler works 
many years ago. I first heard him 
preach about thirty years agQ--{)n 
love and regard for the earth. Sub-
sequently, as he has aged and as I 
have heard him quote from mem-
ory large swatches of Wallace 
Stevens' poetry or speak about 
Christ as Pantocrator in a Byzan-
tine Church in Asia Minor that he 
visited, I want almost to claim that 
I have seen about him the sacred 
penumbra that some believed they 
saw hovering around Bishop 
Joseph Butler toward the end of 
his life. 
It does not matter. In this little 
book peace and restlessness anneal. 
It is the kind of book one recom-
mends just because it is unpreten-
tious, wise, and, yes, warm with the 
things of the spirit. One can keep 
and guard it and then regard it 
again. Cl 
The Note 
Before leaving I write a sloppy mother note, 
the electrician repaired the hall light, and I 
made you a cake, slightly lopsided: 
almost level, almost round 
like a beginning potter's bowl. Eat. 
Frosting will stick to your lips, crumbs 
will fall on your lap, a chunk escape 
to the floor. And if the cat continues to jump 
at the drapery cord, be glad. 
Chaos gives order meaning, a woman 
comes alive: 
her heart swings like a smokey redbird, 
everything in a momentary disarray, 
everything sweet to the lips. 
Pat James 
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Woe to You, 
Dear Doctors 
Dot Nuechterlein 
Doesn't it just frost you? Well, 
maybe it doesn't; maybe this is a 
local problem that does not appear 
in your community, but somehow I 
doubt it. 
I refer to the loathsome, insensi-
tive, abominably arrogant practice 
of many doctors, dentists, hospitals, 
and other assorted medico-types 
who keep their patients and clients 
sitting in "waiting" rooms forever 
before the great ones deign to 
show themselves and tend to busi-
ness. 
Once upon a time I patronized a 
physician who gave individual ap-
pointments to each individual pa-
tient and never kept anyone wait-
ing more than fifteen minutes. On 
those occasions when he had an 
emergency or an unplanned baby 
delivery or was just running late in 
the office, his receptionist would 
call and offer to reschedule the 
time. 
Wow, I have come to learn, was 
he ever a rarity. Many of the cur-
rent crop seem to give a whole pla-
toon of people the same appoint-
ment time; it is really quite a fair 
system, I suppose, because everyone 
sits. Even the first person in the 
door, first thing in the morning, is 
likely to face a period of solemn 
contemplation or a run-through of 
tired old magazines. 
Why do we put up with it? Why 
don't we complain a little, or 
scream and holler a lot? Why do 
we pay them all that money and 
then let them squander so much of 
our time without a peep of protest? 
We gripe about it to one another a 
great deal, judging by the con versa-
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tions I hear regularly, but what 
good does that do if we don't get 
the message across to those in 
charge? 
I'll tell you why we don't: good 
old-fashioned fear. These people 
hold either our lives .or our com-
forts in their hands, and we are a-
fraid that if we displease them by 
expressing our own displeasure 
with them, they will either kick us 
out or make us miserable. 
We would then have to go 
through the tedious process of 
finding someone else who is accept-
ing new patients-not an easy 
task-not to mention the horren-
dous business of filling out those 
thousands of questions on new 
medical history forms and repeat-
ing the stories of our painful pasts 
and the variety of ailments of fam-
ily members to the third and 
fourth generation backwards; and 
then it might turn out that the new 
guy is no better than the old one. 
Ah, friends and neighbors, they've 
got us cold. 
Lest you think that I am anti-doc 
let me hasten to assure you that I 
am not. Most of the members of 
the health care professions that I 
have met over the years have been 
caring, competent men and 
women-and the few who weren't I 
quit seeing quickly. But they seem 
as a whole to have no conception of 
how the rest of us live. 
We may not make life and death 
decisions by the day or play a role 
in turning others' sorrows into joys, 
but many of us feel that we do 
some valuable things with the 
hours allotted us, and it is annoy-
ing to be given to understand that 
obviously our time has no compar-
able worth. 
It would not be a terrible prob-
lem if it happened only now and 
then. No one has total control over 
time, and anyone's timetable can go 
astray, even the most highly placed 
professional's. But the whole thing 
has become so systematic, so to-be-
expected, that the day is long over-
due to speak out. If we don't enjoy 
twiddling our thumbs in the outer 
office or clutching the drapes while 
we sit nudely in the inner sanctum, 
we have to let them know it. 
How do doctors and dentists and 
chiropractors and the rest of the 
privileged few treat one another 
when they serve each other's needs, 
I wonder. Do they spend similar 
hours staring at a compeer's blank 
walls? Pardon my skepticism, but I 
seem to find that hard to believe. 
That would couple pretension with 
not very high level intelligence. No, 
I suspect that this unhappy treat-
ment is reserved for us common 
folk. 
What to do about it? I am not a 
revolutionary rabble-rouser by 
either nature or nurture (although 
to be truthful, I did once upon a 
time organize and lead a strike. No 
joke! Our local TV station cancel-
led Sesame Street, and I convinced a 
number of mothers to join me in 
having our toddlers and preschool-
ers picket the place, waving signs 
with messages like "Bring Back Big 
Bird," and "CKWS-TV Unfair to 
Kids." It was wonderful-! had 
alerted the city paper in advance, 
and news items and photos ran in 
media thousands of miles away. 
Need I add that the program was 
back on the air the following 
week?); but I certainly agree with 
the philosophy that there is power 
in numbers, and if enough of us 
protest at once, our chances are 
better that someone may hear. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I leave it 
to you. You have my permission to, 
as the advice columnists say, "show 
this column to your doctor." And if 
there be any in this small reader-
ship who themselves perpetrate this 
shameful practice, oh, kind sirs and 
ladies, do please mend your ways, 
lest you find yourselves at the 
mercy of an aroused and irate pub-
lic. One shudders to think what 
fate may lie in store for you then. 
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